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Overview
Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) are characterized by difficulties in reciprocal 
social interaction and communication, with restricted interests and stereotyped 
behaviours (ICD-10 criteria; World Health Organisation, 1996). Many of the 
difficulties experienced by individuals with ASD have been attributed to deficits in 
mentalising- the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others in order to 
explain and predict behaviour. This thesis begins by considering the contribution that 
advanced theory of mind tasks have made to our understanding of mentalising 
abilities in ASD. It is concluded that there is substantial evidence that even the 
highest functioning individuals experience difficulties with mentalising. However, 
further progressing our understanding of mentalising in ASD will require a number 
of methodological improvements- in particular, greater attention given to controlling 
the effects of IQ and executive functioning.
The empirical paper draws on these methodological points and explores mentalising 
and other aspects of social cognition in children excluded, or at risk of exclusion, 
from primary schools. Previous research has suggested that a sub-group of these 
children may have unidentified ASD (Gilmour, Hill, Place, & Skuse, 2004). The 
current study assessed primary school children on a range of measures of social 
cognition, including theory of mind. Children excluded from school were 
significantly more likely to meet ICD-10 criteria for ASD than comparisons. 
Furthermore, they were significantly more likely than comparisons to show deficits 
in social cognition and mentalising similar to those documented in ASD. It is
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concluded that there is strong evidence for a sub-group o f children excluded from 
school with unidentified ASD.
The critical appraisal expands on the implications of these findings, focusing on the 
issues involved in screening for ASD, and reflecting on clinical issues raised by the 
research.
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Literature Review
What do advanced Theory of Mind Tasks tell us about mentalising abilities
Autistic Spectrum Disorders?
1.0 Abstract.
Theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others (Kleinman, 
Marciano, & Ault, 2001) has long been considered a central deficit in autism. In 
recent years there has been increasing interest in the mentalising abilities of higher- 
functioning individuals with autism, assessed using ‘advanced’ theory of mind tasks. 
This review considers what these tasks have contributed to our understanding of 
mentalising abilities in high-functioning individuals with autism. It is argued that 
there is substantial evidence for deficits in theory of mind even in the highest 
functioning individuals. Such deficits are not task or domain-specific, but instead 
reflect pervasive differences in the way individuals with autism process information 
about the social world. The review ends by considering implications for theoretical 
models of autism and future research design.
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2.0 Introduction.
2.1 Autism.
Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder characterised by deficits in reciprocal 
social interaction and communication, with restricted interests and stereotyped 
behaviours (ICD-10 criteria; World Health Organisation, 1996). People with autism 
often experience difficulties with social relationships and fail to understand subtle 
aspects of verbal and non-verbal communication, such as sarcasm or gestures. 
Autism is now widely acknowledged to be a spectrum disorder comprising 
individuals with profound learning difficulties through to people with average or 
above average IQ. Similarly, the severity of social communication difficulties may 
vary. ICD-10 currently includes a number of specific disorders within the autistic 
spectrum, including childhood autism, Asperger Syndrome, Atypical Autism and 
Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS).
2.2 Theory of mind.
Many authors have suggested that the core impairments o f autism could result from a 
deficit in ‘Theory of Mind’. Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute mental 
states, such as beliefs, feelings and desires to other people (Kleinman, Marciano, & 
Ault, 2001) and to oneself. This ability allows people to understand what motivates 
the behaviour of other people, and is also commonly referred to as mentalising (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, & Walker, 1995).
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2.3 False belief tasks.
ToM is typically assessed using variants of the ‘False Belief Task’, where the 
participant is ‘presented with a situation in which they know the true identity of a 
hidden object but must deduce that another person, without such knowledge, will 
misidentify the object’ (Kleinman et al., 2001, p.29). Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith 
(1985) find that 90% of typically developing children aged between 3 and 6 years 
pass such tasks, whilst only 20% of children with autism do so. Deficits in 
mentalising ability have been shown to occur for individuals with autism across a 
range of age and intellectual ability / IQ scores (Kleinman et al., 2001).
However, not all individuals with Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) will fail false 
belief tasks. For example, Kerr and Durkin (2004) find that representing mental 
states as ‘thought bubbles’ facilitates performance on false belief tasks amongst 
children with autism. Additionally, many studies find that the majority o f adults with 
high-functioning autism or Asperger Syndrome will pass false belief tasks despite 
experiencing significant difficulties with social communication in everyday life (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Happe, 1994; Roeyers, 
Buysee, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001). However, false belief tasks have a ceiling 
corresponding to a mental age of around 6 years, and so it is not unreasonable to 
expect that older or higher-functioning (in terms of IQ / mental age) individuals with 
ASD would pass such tasks. Passing false belief tasks simply indicates that the 
person has theory o f mind abilities equivalent to those o f a typically developing 4 
year old (Baron-Cohen, O ’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999). As a result,
12
performance on false belief tasks fails to capture the real life mentalising difficulties 
of many individuals with ASD (Abell, Happe, & Frith, 2000).
2.4 Advanced theory of mind tasks.
During the past decade there has been increasing interest in developing ToM tasks 
that measure the ability of these higher functioning individuals with ASD. Such tasks 
are usually termed ‘advanced’ ToM tasks, in that they are designed to test the 
mentalising ability of older and higher ability individuals who will usually pass false 
belief tasks. There are now several well-established advanced ToM tasks, but to date 
there has been no attempt to review the contribution that these tasks have made to 
our understanding o f mentalising abilities in ASD. This review will consider each 
type of task separately, presenting a critique o f the research findings as well as 
considering the reliability and validity of the task itself, before concluding with some 
suggestions for future research in this area. Particular emphasis will be given to the 
influence of verbal ability and executive functioning, as these cognitive domains 
have been shown to influence performance on other theory of mind tasks (e.g., 
Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Jenkins & Astington, 1996). As most studies do not 
demonstrate significant differences between high-functioning autism and Asperger 
Syndrome (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001) this 
review will refer simply to autistic spectrum disorders (ASD).
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3.0 Story tasks.
The Strange Stories Test (Happe, 1994) suggests that individuals with ASD 
experience difficulties making mental state inferences about non-literal utterances. 
This test comprises a set o f short vignettes about everyday situations in which people 
say things they do not literally mean (e.g., telling lies, making jokes or using 
metaphor). Mentalising is required because understanding the speaker’s intent is 
crucial to understanding the utterance.
3.1 Research with adults.
Happe (1994) finds that individuals with autism give significantly more 
inappropriate mental state explanations for non-literal utterances compared to adults 
with learning disabilities and typically developing children, and argues that this 
demonstrates mentalising deficits in higher functioning individuals with ASD. 
Studies using vignettes closely matched to Happe (1994) find consistent deficits 
making mental, but not physical, inferences amongst groups with ASD (e.g., Brent, 
Rios, Happe, & Charman, 2004; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Kaland, Moller- 
Nielson, Smith, Lykke Mortensen, Callensen, & Gottlieb, 2005). This holds even 
when groups are matched on age, gender and IQ (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). 
Studies using more adapted versions fail to find deficits but also fail to adequately 
validate their versions of the task, and so it is not clear whether the findings can be 
meaningfully compared (e.g., Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysee, De Clercq, & Van Der 
Heyden, 2004; Roeyers et al., 2001). Roeyers et al. (2001) compare a group of 
adults with ASD to a group o f comparison adults on an adapted version of the
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Strange Stories. Their task uses the original vignette structure, but adapts the content 
to adult situations and language. They find no differences in the number of mental 
state terms used or in the number of correct mental state explanations given. 
However, this study fails to control IQ. The vignettes are not piloted and no physical 
inference control stories are included, so it is not clear whether the difficulty level is 
set appropriately. Ponnet et al. (2004) remedy some o f these limitations by including 
a control group matched on age and IQ, and again find no differences between 
groups on frequency or appropriateness of mental state explanations. However, again 
this study does not include physical inference control stories. This is particularly 
problematic given that Ponnet et al. (2004) present their participants with two other 
mentalising tasks prior to administering the Strange Stories (the ‘Empathic Accuracy 
Test’ and the Eyes Test) that may have primed the use of mental state terms and 
improved performance in the ASD group. Counterbalancing the order of presentation 
would have strengthened this study.
3.2 Research with children.
The Strange Stories have also been used to demonstrate deficits in theory of mind in 
children and adolescents with ASD. Kaland, Moller-Nielson, Callesen, Lykke 
Mortensen, Gottlieb, and Smith (2002) describe an adapted Strange Stories paradigm 
(‘Stories from Everyday Life’) in which the participant is required to make both 
physical and mental state inferences about the same vignette. They find that 
participants with ASD perform more poorly than typically developing children on 
mentalising stories even when age and IQ are entered as covariates. This supports the 
findings from the adult literature suggesting that individuals with ASD have
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difficulties making mental state inferences (Happe, 1994; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 
1999). Interestingly, Kaland et al. also include reaction time data for half the 
vignettes administered and find that children with ASD take longer than comparison 
children to make both physical and mental state inferences, with the difference being 
more pronounced on mental state inferences. Unfortunately they do not report 
whether these differences remain significant if IQ is entered as a covariate. In this 
study prompt questions were asked if participants gave an incorrect response (e.g., 
asking additional clarification questions or instructing the participant to re-read the 
final paragraph). Individuals with ASD required significantly more prompts than 
comparison adults overall, and required more prompts on mental state inferences 
compared to physical state inferences. These findings suggest that making 
inferences, and particularly mental state inferences, is more effortful for children 
with ASD compared to typically developing children.
Although Kaland et al. (2002) report administering the original Strange Stories and 
finding high correlations between the two measures, these results are unfortunately 
not reported. The same research group present data using the original Strange Stories 
Test and find that children and adolescents with ASD perform more poorly on 
mentalising inferences than controls, whilst no differences are seen on physical 
inferences (Kaland et al., 2005). Brent et al. (2004) compare a group of children with 
ASD aged 6-12 years with a typically developing control group on the Strange 
Stories and find that children with ASD perform more poorly on the mentalising 
stories but not on the physical inference stories. Interestingly, they also find that 
performance on mentalising and physical inference stories is correlated in both ASD 
and typically developing children. This implies the stories contain shared demands
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not specific to making physical or mental inferences, and therefore research in this 
area needs to address generic information processing contributions to successful task 
performance, such as working memory and executive functioning (Brent et al., 
2004).
3.3 Reliability / validity issues.
There are a number of issues with the use of the Strange Stories Test as a measure of 
mentalising ability in high-functioning individuals with ASD. Participants are 
typically allowed unlimited time to formulate responses, with the vignette left in 
view for reference in order to minimise the effects of memory on performance. 
However, this clearly allows for much greater time to reason through the situation 
than would be available in everyday social interactions. As Hermelin and O ’Connor 
(1985) suggest, this may encourage individuals with ASD to give some form of 
mental state answer through cognitive reasoning processes. The Strange Stories 
therefore may not capture the unique difficulties faced by individuals with ASD in 
everyday life. Several studies comment on the idiosyncratic response style of 
participants with ASD (Kaland et al., 2005) but do not attempt to analyse this in any 
more detail. Similarly, giving prompts when incorrect responses are given (e.g., 
Kaland et al., 2002) gives increased salience to relevant information and so may 
minimise task demands. Drawing attention to relevant information in false belief 
tasks facilitates performance in both typically developing children (see Roth & 
Leslie, 1998) and those with ASD (Kerr & Durkin, 2004).
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Although Happe (1994) reports reasonable attempts at validating the task, there 
remain a number of issues. No study validates the assertion that each vignette has 
only one reasonably appropriate explanation for the non-literal utterance. 
Additionally, if this statement were assumed to be true, there seems little justification 
for allowing appropriate physical explanations for mental state inferences to be 
scored as correct (see Happe, 1994 for scoring criteria). It seems plausible that 
individuals who make physical state explanations of situations and interaction when 
a mental state explanation is more parsimonious would appear odd in everyday life. 
Equally, responses can be scored as incorrect due to factual or inferential errors, and 
yet the implications of these error types might be very different. Finally, there has 
been no substantial attempt to explore the typical developmental trajectory on this 
task, and so it is not clear how to interpret findings suggesting that some vignettes 
are more difficult than others. For example, humour develops through childhood and 
adolescence (e.g., Reddy, Williams, & Vaughan, 2002). Without such information it 
is difficult to justify why different subsets of vignettes are included in different 
studies- this means that true replication is not achieved. Addressing these 
methodological and conceptual issues in further research would lend greater support 
to the assertion that individuals with ASD show mentalising deficits when 
interpreting non-literal utterances.
18
4.0 Cartoon tasks.
There is limited evidence for mentalising deficits in ASD from cartoon / humour 
tasks. Participants are presented with cartoons requiring understanding of false belief 
to appreciate the humour. However, only two studies have explored how individuals 
with ASD perform on the Cartoon Task (Happe, Winner, & Brownell, 1998).
Brent et al. (2004) find no differences between children with ASD and typically 
developing children on this task, and furthermore find that performance on the 
cartoons does not correlate with performance on the Strange Stories. They suggest 
that the Cartoons Task may not be a useful tool for measuring ToM in children, as 
they may not have acquired the conventions of humour. In contrast, Emerich, 
Creaghead, Grether, Murray, and Grasha (2003) find that adolescents with autism 
have significantly more difficulty than typically developing adolescents in 
comprehending cartoons and jokes. However, the cartoons used in Emerich et al. 
were not designed to elicit mentalising responses, so it is unclear how to interpret this 
finding. Gallagher et al. (2000) use the Cartoons Task to explore the neural correlates 
o f ToM using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). They find that there is 
considerable overlap in brain regions activated by story and cartoon tasks. Gallagher 
et al. suggest that in viewing cartoons people (with or without ASD) try to work out 
what the artist intended the cartoon to mean, engaging mentalising activity. This may 
also help to explain why the Cartoons Task fails to demonstrate mentalising deficits 
in ASD. It is clear that far more research is needed to explore the typical 
developmental trajectory o f humour and to explore how adults with ASD perform on 
the Cartoons Test.
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5.0 Eyes tasks.
Adults and children with ASD show deficits relative to typically developing 
individuals on the Eyes Test. Participants are shown photographs of the eye region of 
faces and asked to choose which mental state term best describes what the person is 
thinking or feeling (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe et al., 1997). This task requires theory of 
mind since the participant has to understand mental state terms and match them to 
aspects of facial expression. To control for difficulties with basic emotion 
recognition skills and face perception, participants are asked to complete a basic 
emotion recognition task (recognising happy, sad, angry, disgusted, fearful, and 
surprised emotions from faces- Ekman & Friesen, 1971) and to judge gender from 
the eye region alone.
5.1 Research with adults.
Adults with ASD perform more poorly than comparison adults on the mentalising 
task but not on either control task (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe et al., 1997; Kleinman et 
al., 2001). These deficits remain even when task difficulty is increased and groups 
are matched on verbal IQ (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). 
A compelling case for the sensitivity of this task in detecting mentalising deficits is 
made by Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Stone, and Rutherford (1999), who present 
data from three extremely high-functioning individuals with ASD (IQ scores 1 BO- 
143) and compare these individuals to an age-matched control group. The individuals 
with AS perform > 1 SD below the mean of the control group on the Eyes Test, 
whilst performing > 1 SD above the mean of the control group on a physical
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reasoning task. This study is particularly convincing in that it demonstrates the 
presence of deficits even in the highest functioning individuals. Furthermore, by 
including the Tower of Hanoi task, a measure of planning and problem-solving, they 
demonstrate that deficits in executive functioning are unlikely to account for the 
mentalising deficits observed. Although a few studies report contradictory findings 
(Roeyers et al., 2001; Ponnet et al., 2004), these studies are also the only studies to 
use slightly different stimuli and administration protocols. Ponnet et al. (2004) find 
no differences between adults with ASD and controls, and whilst their sample size is 
relatively small (n = 19) the groups are matched in terms of age and IQ. Their task 
asks participants to choose the appropriate mental state word to match photographs 
of the eye region from three options and is therefore less robust psychometrically 
than the Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) task, which includes four response options.
5.2 Research with children.
The Eyes Test has also been used to demonstrate theory of mind deficits in children 
and adolescents with ASD. Introducing the Children’s Version of the Eyes Test, 
Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) find that children with ASD perform more poorly than 
typically developing children aged 8-10 and 10-12 years, but do not differ from 
typically developing children aged 6-8 years. By including a challenging physical 
inference task, Baron-Cohen et al. show that mentalising deficits in the ASD group 
cannot be due to global reasoning deficits since the ASD group perform better than 
typically developing children on this control task. However, they do not adequately 
control the effects of IQ on performance, as IQ is not directly measured in the 
typically developing participants. Although limited by the very small ASD sample (n
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= 15) and failure to control IQ, this study does establish the typical developmental 
trajectory on this task using a substantial control sample (n = 53).
Brent et al. (2004) replicate these findings, comparing a group of children with ASD 
aged 6-12 years with a group of typically developing children. Children with ASD 
perform less well than typically developing children on the Eyes Test, and whilst 
performance does not correlate with IQ, it does correlate with language age 
equivalents. Interestingly, they find that whilst performance on the Eyes Test 
correlates with performance on the Strange Stories in typically developing children, 
this correlation is not seen in children with ASD. They raise the possibility that the 
social communication system is more fractionated in children with ASD compared to 
typically developing children. Whilst this is an appealing hypothesis that might help 
to explain the variability in presentation of individuals with ASD, it seems a little 
premature given that this study does not include measures of executive functioning. 
Within the age range tested, executive functions are still developing in line with the 
development and myelination of the frontal lobes (see Paus, 2005) and so it is crucial 
to examine how these abilities affect performance. It is plausible that children with 
relatively better executive functioning would demonstrate more integrated (and 
hence more highly correlated) social communication abilities due to their greater 
ability to integrate knowledge and skills across contexts (tasks) compared to children 
with relatively poorer executive functioning.
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5.3 Reliability / validity issues.
Although it is unfortunate that the majority of studies using the Eyes Test stem from 
the same research group, this has clearly contributed to greater emphasis on measure 
development promoting more reliable research findings (see Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001). Construct validity is established by correlating performance on the Eyes Test 
with severity of autistic spectrum traits (using the Autism Spectrum Quotient- Baron- 
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001). Further support for the 
construct validity of the measure is found by Kleinman et al. (2001), who correlate 
performance on the Eyes Test with a similarly structured Voice Test (see later in this 
review) and find that individuals with ASD struggle on both tasks. In contrast to the 
Strange Stories, the Eyes Test is more readily amenable to producing continuous 
measures of performance, such as reaction time or error analyses. This makes it a 
more sensitive measure for use amongst very high-functioning individuals who may 
be able to use their significant intellectual resources to reason through mentalising 
tasks, albeit in an idiosyncratic or laborious manner. S. Baron-Cohen (personal 
communication, October 12, 2005) reports that his research group do not have any 
reaction time data from their computerised version of the Eyes Test ready for 
publication; it is to be hoped that such data become available shortly.
However, the Eyes Test has less ecological validity than other advanced theory of 
mind tasks. In everyday situations a person has more information available to them 
to judge mental states. Although other aspects of facial expression provide less 
information about mental states than the eyes (e.g., mouth position- Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997), there is much information gleaned from context and
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contingent events surrounding the facial expression. Integrating information from 
such different contexts is likely to be dependent on sufficiently advanced executive 
functioning- this may help to explain the failure of the Eyes Test to correlate with 
other measures of mentalising in children (Brent et al., 2004). Additionally, it is 
likely that the simplified stimuli of the Eyes Test mean that performance on this test, 
as with other static measures of mentalising, may not correlate highly with symptom 
severity. Although Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) report a significant inverse correlation 
between performance on the Eyes Test and the Autism Spectrum Quotient, this is a 
relatively new measure of symptom severity. Stronger evidence would be generated 
by using more psychometrically established measures (e.g., Autism Diagnostic 
Interview- Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994).
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6.0 Voice tasks.
6.1 Research with adults.
Two studies provide preliminary evidence for deficits in mentalising from voice 
stimuli in adults with ASD (Kleinman et al., 2001; Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, & 
Wheelwright, 2002). Kleinman et al. (2001) present the phrase ‘The quick brown fox 
jumped over the lazy dog’ spoken with varying emotional expressions, and ask 
participants to choose between two adjectives to describe the mental state of the 
speaker. They find that whilst comparison participants approach ceiling performance, 
participants with ASD do not and show far greater within group variability. By also 
administering the Eyes Test, they find that attributing mental states is easier when 
presented with voices than with static pictures of the eyes. A similar measure is 
presented by Rutherford et al. (2002). The ‘Reading the Mind in the Voice Test’ 
presents participants with segments of dialogue and a forced choice between the 
target mental state and its semantic opposite. Rutherford et al. find that adults with 
ASD perform significantly more poorly than age and IQ matched comparison 
participants, and furthermore that performance on the Voices Test does not correlate 
with verbal IQ.
6.2 Reliability / validity issues.
Both these measures require psychometric improvements, as Rutherford et al. 
acknowledge. Offering just two forced-choice options means that the likelihood of 
performing well on the task simply by chance is far too high. Increasing the response
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options and the number of items would significantly increase the robustness of the 
measure and thus make it more useful in examining subtle deficits. Similarly, using 
the target word and its semantic opposite is likely to be too easy for adult 
participants- as demonstrated by ceiling performance by comparison participants in 
the Kleinman et al. study. These limitations make it difficult to interpret the finding 
that attributing mental states is easier from voice than from eye information. Further 
studies are required to replicate these findings with a more psychometrically robust 
version of the task and to explore how typically developing children and children 
with ASD perform.
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7.0 Animations.
Analysing the spontaneous narratives of individuals with ASD exposes subtle 
ongoing deficits in mentalising abilities, manifest as giving inappropriate mentalising 
responses (Abell et al., 2000; Klin, 2000).
7.1 Research with adults.
Klin (2000) uses the Heider and Simmel (1944) animations to explore differences in 
social attribution between a group of adults with ASD and comparison adults 
matched on age and verbal IQ. These animations feature geometric shapes moving in 
both random and contingent patterns around a rectangle. Marked differences are seen 
in the ability to generate pertinent explanations of events in the movie. Adults with 
ASD use significantly fewer appropriate mental state terms than comparisons, with 
on average one-third o f attributions made by the clinical groups being unrelated to 
the movie. Interestingly, when participants were instructed to view the shapes as 
people, performance improved slightly but non-significantly in the ASD group, but 
not in the comparison group. Furthermore, performance did not correlate 
significantly with verbal IQ, age or language competence (Klin, 2000).
7.2 Research with children.
Bowler and Thommen (2000) use the Heider and Simmel (1944) stimuli to explore 
mentalising abilities in children with autism aged 7-10 years. They find that even 
typically developing children perform at floor level when asked to describe the
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events, and so it does not appear to be a useful stimulus for exploring mentalising in 
children.
In contrast, Abell et al. (2000) adapt the Heider and Simmel movie and use it to 
demonstrate deficits in mentalising in children with ASD. They present participants 
with animations involving a red triangle and a blue triangle moving around a 
rectangle. Participants view the animation and are then asked to describe what 
happened. They compare a group of children with autism to a verbal mental age 
(VMA) and age matched group of children with learning disabilities, a group of 
typically developing children and a group of adult comparisons. Although no 
differences are seen between groups in the frequency of mentalising responses, 
children with autism give significantly more inappropriate mentalising responses 
than any other group (36%, versus just 3% in the children with learning disabilities, 
7% in typically developing children and 2% in adult controls). This supports 
evidence from other advanced tasks suggesting that it is not the use o f mental state 
terms that distinguishes individuals with ASD from typically developing individuals, 
but rather the ability to use these terms appropriately when required.
7.3 Reliability / validity issues.
The novel non-verbal stimuli of these narrative tasks, coupled with continuous 
measures of performance, reveal deficits in mentalising more readily than static, 
dichotomous measures (see Klin, 2000). Despite the relatively few studies available 
using animations, reasonable attempts have been made to establish reliability and 
validity. The Abell et al. (2000) animations were piloted with typically developing
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adults, showing that adults gave correct descriptions for 89% of mentalising 
animations, 93% of goal-directed animations and 64% of random animations. 
Although this is based on a very small sample, the fact that different animations elicit 
different types o f description supports the face validity of this measure. Furthermore, 
criterion validity is addressed using performance on false belief tasks, as even those 
participants who passed standard false belief tasks performed poorly on the theory of 
mind animations (Abell et al, 2000). Unfortunately, performance on the animations 
has not yet been examined in relation to social competence.
The ability to coherently describe the events in each animation is dependent on a 
number of factors, crucially including executive functions such as generativity, 
working memory, the ability to integrate information from a variety of sources and 
so on (see Abell et al, 2000 for a different view). No study has yet examined the 
relationship between performance on the animations and executive functioning. 
Although it is notable that animations requiring mentalising responses are more 
challenging for individuals with ASD than those requiring physical / goal-directed 
responses (Abell et al., 2000), it is not clear from the studies conducted whether this 
reflects increased executive or memory demands. Describing events as the 
animations are shown (rather than at the end) would decrease memory demands and 
potentially reveal even greater difficulties on the theory of mind animations, as 
individuals with ASD would have reduced opportunity to scaffold their mentalising 
abilities with verbally-mediated reasoning strategies (see Klin, 2000). If executive 
dysfunction does account for difficulties experienced by individuals with ASD, 
structuring responses more highly (as in Klin, 2000) would be expected to yield 
improved performance compared to unstructured response formats (as in Abell et al.,
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2000). This is an empirical question that warrants testing. Furthermore, it is plausible 
that performance by individuals with ASD may be facilitated by giving ‘character 
roles’ to the geometric shapes (as in Abell et al., 2000), and it remains to be 
demonstrated what effect removing this cue would have on performance. This may 
facilitate performance by highlighting the presence of another mind- suggesting that 
individuals with ASD possess the concept o f others’ mental states, but fail to apply 
this concept spontaneously and / or apply it in an idiosyncratic manner.
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8.0 Naturalistic measures.
Naturalistic measures of mentalising ability have provided preliminary evidence for 
mentalising deficits in ASD.
8.1 Research with adults.
Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, and Rutter (2000) argue that naturalistic assessments 
increase the sensitivity of theory of mind tasks, since they tap into ‘on-line’ 
processing skills. They explore how individuals with ASD infer the thoughts and 
feelings of actors seen in short clips, comparing this group with an age and IQ 
matched comparison group. Adults with ASD make more errors when asked to report 
characters’ thoughts, feelings and intentions than comparisons, suggesting deficits in 
theory of mind abilities. Furthermore, this could not be explained in terms of 
language ability. However, as Heavey et al. acknowledge, performance on such 
measures cannot be considered a pure test of mentalising ability, since such tasks are 
clearly dependent on other skills such as executive functioning. It is interesting to 
note that performance on this task failed to correlate significantly with performance 
on the Strange Stories, a far more established measure of mentalising ability that 
places fewer demands in terms of integrating information and allocating attentional 
resources. Furthermore, it is disappointing that this study does not include measures 
of everyday social competence, given that the reason given for developing these 
tasks was to more closely approximate everyday difficulties within a controlled 
setting (Heavey et al., 2000).
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A similar approach is presented by Roeyers et al. (2001). They compare a group of 
adults with ASD to a group of age, gender and education matched comparisons on 
the ‘Empathic Accuracy Task’. This task involves watching short videotapes of two 
strangers interacting, and answering questions about what each individual was 
thinking or feeling at particular points during the clip. Since the videotapes are 
genuine interactions, responses can be compared to the thoughts and feelings 
reported by the individuals immediately after the clip was recorded and indices of 
accuracy generated. Roeyers et al. (2001) find that individuals with ASD are poorer 
than comparisons in inferring unexpressed thoughts and feelings. This finding is 
replicated by Ponnet et al. (2004), comparing a group of adults with ASD and 
typically developing adults. Furthermore, Ponnet et al. find that individuals with 
ASD are particularly poor at inferring the thoughts and feelings of others when these 
involve past memories (i.e., ‘This reminds me o f .. .’), and when these involve other 
persons (i.e, ‘He thinks I’m ...’). In contrast, they are relatively better at inferring the 
thoughts and feelings of others when these relate to the self (i.e, ‘I’m bored’). They 
suggest that these differences may be explained in terms of individuals with ASD 
using different behavioural cues to infer the mental states of others. Individuals with 
ASD have difficulty recognising emotions (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Howard 
et al., 2000). Similar analyses in terms of sensitivity to particular non-verbal 
gestures, patterns o f eye gaze and so on would help to make more sense of the 
findings on the Empathic Accuracy Task. Furthermore, such detailed analyses would 
also yield greater insight into the everyday difficulties experienced by individuals 
with ASD and might help develop more useful social skills training than is currently 
available.
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8.2 Reliability / validity issues.
It is unfortunate that these studies do not include measures of social competence to 
explore how well naturalistic assessments capture everyday difficulties- it is assumed 
that naturalistic measures will correlate better with adaptive functioning, but this is 
not tested empirically. Performance on these tasks does not simply reflect 
mentalising abilities. It is self-evident that they place demands on executive 
functioning, similar to most other advanced mind-reading tasks currently available. 
However, these studies do not control executive functioning and it is therefore 
difficult to be sure to what extent difficulties reflect mentalising deficits. In addition, 
the videotapes themselves require far greater validation with typically developing 
individuals than has yet been undertaken. As such, these studies should only be 
viewed as preliminary evidence supporting theory of mind deficits in ASD. Larger 
sample sizes will be required to reliably examine subtle differences between groups, 
such as the ability to infer thoughts about memories noted by Ponnet et al. (2004).
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9.0 Conclusions.
Advanced theory of mind tasks demonstrate mentalising deficits in individuals with 
ASD, both children and adults. Although a few studies fail to detect such deficits, 
they are in the clear minority. Assuming that theory of mind deficits in high- 
functioning individuals are likely to be subtle, sample sizes across the literature are 
too small to enable sufficient statistical power to detect such effects, and this may 
help to explain contradictory findings. As methodologies become more complex, 
introducing continuous measures of performance such as reaction time and narrative 
abilities, it is becoming increasingly difficult to argue that deficits in mentalising 
reflect more fundamental differences in age, IQ or language abilities. Studies have 
found significant differences between individuals with ASD and comparisons even 
when age, IQ and language are carefully controlled in statistical analyses. Significant 
correlations between different tasks (e.g., Brent et al., 2004; Kleinman et al., 2001), 
involving different presentation and response formats, provide strong evidence for an 
underlying pervasive deficit in theory of mind, since additional (non-mentalising) 
factors vary between tasks.
9.1 Methodological limitations.
This is not to say, however, that it is clear what skills or cognitive domains are 
measured by each task. Across the literature as a whole, there is a failure to 
adequately control intellectual ability. Many studies only measure IQ in their clinical 
groups, arguing that IQ can be assumed to be within the normal range in their control 
participants (e.g., Roeyers et al, 2001). This is a far from adequate approach when
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examining deficits that, if present, are likely to be subtle. Many tasks involve pass / 
fail analyses or other simple dichotomous measures that are widely acknowledged to 
be unsuitable for examining subtle deficits. Greater use of continuous performance 
measures, such as reaction time, will be required if our understanding of ToM in 
ASD is to develop. In addition, very few studies attempt to control for executive 
functioning, despite repeated statements that these tasks place considerable demands 
on executive skills (e.g., Brent et al., 2004; Ponnet et al., 2004). The case series 
reported by Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) is a notable exception, and as such provides 
some of the most compelling evidence for mentalising deficits in ASD. The approach 
adopted in that paper will be required in order to progress our understanding o f how 
executive functioning, language, intellectual abilities and ToM interact. However, it 
is also clear that controlling executive functioning is far from easy. Studies of 
individuals with brain injuries have repeatedly demonstrated how difficult it is to 
detect executive dysfunction using standardised measures (Shallice & Burgess, 1991) 
even when difficulties are readily apparent in everyday life. Additionally, executive 
functions are not clearly delineated or defined- there is considerable overlap between 
terms used (for example, working memory and divided attention) and considerable 
shared demands between tasks.
9.2 Developmental trajectories.
There is also an overwhelming lack of understanding about the typical 
developmental trajectory on advanced theory of mind tasks. For example, it is far 
from clear that performance on each vignette on the Strange Stories would improve 
equally with age. This makes it difficult to interpret evidence o f deficits on particular
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vignettes. It is inadequate to assume that performance improves in a linear fashion 
through childhood and adolescence. For example, recognition of anger decreases 
during adolescence (Lawrence, Bernstein et al., 2006), and there is some evidence to 
suggest improved mentalising abilities in older adults compared to younger adults 
(Happe, Winner & Brownell, 1998). Recent studies o f typically developing 
individuals suggest that mentalising abilities may plateau between the ages o f 10 and 
13 years, associated with the onset of puberty (Lawrence, Campbell, Bernstein, 
Pearson, & Skuse, 2006). Most studies have not explored whether there are sex 
differences in performance on these tasks. Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe et al. (1997) find 
evidence for a female advantage on the Eyes Test in typically developing individuals, 
but this finding is not replicated in later studies (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
Lawrence, Bernstein et al. (2006) find that girls reach ceiling performance 
recognising happy faces at 6 years, whereas boys do not reach ceiling until 9 years of 
age. They note that where gender differences are present, they decrease with age. If 
present, sex differences are likely to be small and thus would require far larger 
sample sizes than typically employed in this literature.
9.3 Relationship to adaptive functioning.
Furthermore, the literature fails to relate performance on advanced ToM tasks to 
everyday social competence. Even naturalistic assessments, such as the Empathic 
Accuracy Task and Awkward Moments Test, have not yet been correlated with 
measures of adaptive functioning or measures of autistic traits. Preliminary attempts 
to relate performance on the Eyes Test to a measure of autistic symptom severity (the 
Autism Spectrum Quotient) were reported by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001), but this is a
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relatively new measure whose psychometric properties and scoring criteria warrant 
further validation. Given that there is ongoing controversy regarding the validity of 
autistic spectrum diagnoses, and the extent to which diagnoses can be reliably 
distinguished, it would seem more useful to relate performance to autistic traits rather 
than to diagnoses. One relatively new measure that would facilitate this approach is 
the Developmental, Dimensional and Diagnostic Interview (3di- Skuse et al., 2004) a 
computerised psychiatric interview generating dimensional information for key 
symptom clusters (social expressiveness, reciprocal social interaction, language, use 
of gesture and other non-verbal communication, and stereotypy and repetitive 
behaviours). Adopting a similar, symptom-based approach to research has proved 
fruitful in other areas of research involving long-term social disability, such as 
psychosis.
9.4 Theoretical implications.
The presence of mentalising deficits in even the highest functioning individuals with 
ASD has a number of theoretical implications. Firstly, it confirms the importance of 
adopting a lifespan approach to the development of ToM, rather than simply focusing 
on the preschool years. It is clear that mentalising ability develops beyond the level 
required to pass false belief tasks (e.g., Happe et al., 1998) and these developments 
may be non-linear in nature (Lawrence, Campbell et al., 2006). Such non-linear 
trends in development will require further investigation, but clearly highlight the 
importance of considering stage of development (in addition to age and intellectual 
ability) when examining mentalising.
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Secondly, it supports the validity of the term ‘autistic spectrum disorder’ to refer to 
individuals with autism, Asperger Syndrome and PDD-NOS. Individuals with these 
different diagnoses may present very differently, but share a core deficit in ToM. In 
recent years there has been much concern regarding ‘over-diagnosis’ of autistic 
spectrum disorders. If mentalising can be conceptualised as a continuum, the 
emphasis shifts from identifying a reliable and valid diagnosis to identifying the 
point at which intervention is required. This is not to disregard the importance of 
diagnosis- getting a diagnosis is often the only way to access appropriate educational, 
occupational, financial and social support. However, directing research towards 
finding appropriate and effective interventions for the ‘symptoms’ of ASD is likely 
to be of even greater benefit.
The failure to detect reliable and replicable sex differences in mentalising has 
implications for theories attempting to explain autism as an extreme form of the male 
brain (Baron-Cohen, 1999). As noted, if present, sex differences are likely to be very 
small, and it is unclear how important a role they may play. Autism is known to be 
far more prevalent in males than females, and there is consensus amongst clinicians 
that females with ASD may present very differently to their male counterparts. As 
Lawrence, Campbell et al. (2006) highlight, early differences in the emergence of 
mentalising abilities may become too small to detect in later childhood and 
adulthood. They outline two possibilities: boys are delayed in their acquisition o f 
ToM skills, or they recruit different neural / information-processing strategies to 
reach the same goal. Functional imaging studies are clearly needed to explore this 
question, and address whether the processing strategies present in autism are indeed
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an extreme version of those present in typically developing males (Baron-Cohen,
1999).
9.5 Directions for future research.
In order to progress our understanding of theory of mind abilities in ASD, a number 
of components must be built into any future research. Groups must be matched on 
both age and verbal IQ- given the subtlety of the deficits, it is essential that IQ is 
directly measured in both clinical and comparison groups. Including measures of 
autistic spectrum traits (e.g., 3di- Skuse et al., 2004) as well as measures o f social 
competence and comprehensive assessments of executive functioning (e.g., The Test 
of Everyday Attention- Manly, Robertson, Anderson, & Nimmo-Smith, 1998) will 
be crucial. Although this means increased length of assessment, it also means that 
researchers can begin to examine the complex inter-relationships between these 
factors and mentalising abilities. This aim is best served by using ToM measures that 
yield continuous data (e.g., reaction time) and whose developmental trajectory is 
known (e.g., Eyes Test; Abell et al., 2000 animations).
Finally, it would also be helpful to draw greater attention to what high-functioning 
individuals with ASD are able to tell us about their experience of mentalising. 
Detailed case assessments of individuals, whilst sacrificing generalisability, allow for 
some fascinating insights into the subjective experiences of individuals with ASD. 
As one of the participants in Baron-Cohen et al. (1999) comments:
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My mind is like a digital computer: it is either on or off.
Information is either true or false. Other people’s minds are 
like analogue computers, with smoothly varying voltages and 
manifesting fuzzy logic.
Such cogent descriptions are a clear reminder of the need for studies in this area to 
attend to the subjective experience of individuals, as well as attempting to categorise 
and explain their difficulties.
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Neuropsychological functioning and social communication in children excluded
from primary school
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1.0 Abstract.
A sub-group of children excluded from school may have unidentified autistic 
spectrum disorders (ASD; Gilmour, Hill, Place, & Skuse, 2004). The current study 
tested this hypothesis by comparing children excluded from primary school to their 
peers on a range of neuropsychological and social cognitive measures sensitive to 
deficits in ASD. Children were also evaluated against ICD-10 criteria for ASD, 
conduct disorder and hyperkinesis. Over a third of excluded children met criteria for 
ASD in addition to conduct disorder and / or hyperkinesis. Children excluded from 
school were more likely than comparisons to show deficits on a range o f measures, 
including pragmatic language, theory of mind and attentional switching. These 
deficits could not be accounted for by differences in IQ or socio-economic status. It 
is argued that there is strong evidence that a sub-group of children with conduct 
problems also have unrecognised ASD. Furthermore, there is a need for greater 
collaboration between clinical psychology and educational services to meet the needs 
o f this group.
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2.0 Introduction.
2.1 Exclusion.
The rate of permanent exclusion from school has risen over the past decade with 
0.13% of children permanently excluded from schools in 2003 / 2004, 13% of which 
were from primary school (DfES, 2005). Such children obtain on average only 10% 
as much education as their peers (Parsons, 1996), with each excluded child costing 
public services over £30,000 (Bagley & Pritchard, 1998). Boys are four times more 
likely to be permanently excluded than girls, with Afro-Caribbean pupils twice as 
likely to be excluded as White pupils, whilst children with Special Educational 
Needs (SEN) are more than seven times more likely to be excluded than children 
without SEN (DfES, 2005). The relationship between early learning difficulties, 
exclusion from school and crime has been described as a ‘downward spiral’, in 
which children who lack basic literacy and numeracy skills develop low self-esteem 
and become disillusioned with education, eventually leaving school early and / or 
truanting (Basic Skills Agency, 1997). Being excluded from school is associated with 
a significantly higher likelihood of becoming a teenage parent, being unemployed or 
homeless later in life, or serving a sentence in prison (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998).
2.1.1 Persistent disruptive behaviour.
Persistent disruptive behaviour is the most common reason for permanent exclusion, 
accounting for 30% of all exclusions, with 20% attributed to verbal abuse towards 
adults and a further 20% to assault on other pupils (DfES, 2005). Research published
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in the Social Exclusion Report (1998) suggests that teachers are uncertain of the 
distinction between poor behaviour and behaviour reflecting underlying difficulties 
requiring specialist management. With government and media attention directed at 
exclusion, there is increasing impetus to understand the factors underlying disruptive 
behaviour and hence introduce more appropriate supports and interventions (Ripley 
& Yuill, 2005).
2 .1.2 Neurodevelopmental influences on disruptive behaviour.
There is an extensive literature describing pervasive neuro-developmental factors 
associated with disruptive behaviour in childhood. Children with disruptive 
behaviour are known to experience a range of neurocognitive deficits, across both 
verbal and visual domains, and hyperactivity (Moffitt, Caspi, Rutter, & Silva, 2001). 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the neurocognitive profile of children and young 
people with disruptive behaviour moderates the effectiveness of interventions 
(Fishbein et al., 2006).
High levels of unrecognised language impairment have been demonstrated in 
children with behavioural difficulties (e.g., Cohen, Barwick, Horodsky, Vallance, & 
Im, 1998). Many boys excluded from school have significantly poorer expressive 
language abilities than age-matched comparison boys; however, a significant 
proportion of children with disruptive behaviour problems do not show such 
structural language difficulties (Ripley & Yuill, 2005). There is preliminary 
evidence that a sub-group o f children with disruptive behaviour show deficits in 
pragmatic language skills but not in more overt, structural language skills.
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Pragmatics may be defined as the appropriate use and interpretation of language in 
relation to context (Bishop, 1997). Gilmour, Hill, Place, and Skuse (2004) explored 
pragmatic language skills in children diagnosed with conduct disorder (CD) and 
autistic spectrum disorders (ASD), a community sample of school-excluded children, 
and a group of typically developing children. Using the Children’s Communication 
Checklist (Bishop, 1998), they showed that a significant proportion of children 
diagnosed with CD showed deficits in pragmatic language skills as severe as children 
diagnosed with ASD. Furthermore, over two-thirds of the school-excluded children 
showed deficits in pragmatic language skills comparable to the clinically defined 
ASD sample. Gilmour et al. argue that this demonstrates significant and 
unrecognised social communication deficits in a sub-group of children presenting 
with conduct problems. They suggest that a proportion of children with behavioural 
problems who are at risk of exclusion from school may have underlying unidentified 
ASD.
2.2 ASD and exclusion.
Individuals with ASD show deficits in social interaction and communication, with 
restricted interests and stereotyped behaviours (ICD-10 criteria; World Health 
Organisation, 1996). They often experience difficulties with social relationships and 
fail to understand subtle aspects of verbal and non-verbal communication such as 
sarcasm or gestures. It is widely thought that many difficulties experienced by 
individuals with ASD reflect deficits in theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental 
states to oneself and others in order to predict and explain behaviour (Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Children with social communication deficits may fail to
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appreciate social hierarchies, treating all people the same, and hence appearing rude 
to teachers (Gilmour et al., 2004). They may fail to appreciate the subtleties of 
language, such as metaphor and sarcasm, and so become bewildered when they are 
disciplined for following instructions literally. Since many children with ASD have 
average or above average IQ, they may be able to use their intellectual capacities to 
mask their social communication difficulties. Furthermore, children whose behaviour 
and social skills lag behind their intellectual potential are at risk of being labelled 
‘lazy’ or ‘deliberately difficult’. Barnard, Prior, and Potter (2000) warn that one in 
five children with autism are excluded from school, a rate almost twenty times the 
national average. It is therefore plausible that exclusions are occurring for children 
whose difficulties accessing the curriculum and regulating their behaviour could be 
better understood, and hence better managed, in the context of ASD.
2.3 Neurodevelopmental deficits in children excluded from school: ASD, CD or 
hyperactivity?
However, there are other developmental disorders in which disruptive behaviour is 
common, crucially Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD; Kim & Kaiser,
2000) and CD (Gilmour et al., 2004). To demonstrate previously unidentified ASD in 
a sub-group of children excluded from school, it is necessary to demonstrate that 
these children present with difficulties that discriminate ASD from other 
developmental disorders associated with disruptive behaviour. However, there is 
increasing recognition that the boundaries between developmental disorders, and 
between developmental disorders and psychiatric disorders, are less clear-cut than 
previously thought (Bishop & Baird, 2001; Gilmour et al., 2004). It is likely that
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many disorders will share underlying neurocognitive deficits but manifest very 
differently, possibly as a result of interactions with environmental factors (Taylor & 
Warner Rogers, 2005).
This study therefore aimed to extend the findings of Gilmour et al. (2004) to explore 
the differences and similarities between children at risk of exclusion from school 
(henceforth ‘excluded’) and typically developing children, focusing on 
neurocognitive abilities known to be impaired in children with ASD. Since 
behavioural problems often increase in severity with age (e.g., Botting & Conti- 
Ramsden, 2000) this study focused on children attending primary schools. At this 
age, it is less likely that behavioural difficulties underlie neuropsychological deficits, 
as might be hypothesised in older children. Furthermore, if underlying 
neurocognitive deficits could be identified at an early age, appropriate supports could 
be put in place to improve the educational experience of such children and reduce the 
risk of academic underachievement in later years.
2.3.1 Diagnostic classification.
There is very little evidence documenting the incidence of developmental and 
psychiatric diagnoses in children excluded from school. However, it is known that 
children with ASD are significantly more likely to be excluded than peers (Barnard 
et al., 2000) and that children with unidentified special needs are more likely to be 
excluded than those whose needs have been identified (DfES, 2005). Research has 
shown that a significant sub-group of excluded children present with deficits similar 
in nature and severity to those seen in ASD (Gilmour et al., 2004). It was predicted
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that children excluded from school would be significantly more likely to meet 
criteria for ASD compared to peers.
2.3.2 Intellectual functioning.
There is a substantial literature exploring the intellectual profile of children with 
ASD. Higher-functioning individuals with ASD are usually characterised by 
relatively better verbal abilities in comparison to non-verbal abilities (e.g., Klin, 
Volkmar, Sparrow, Cicchetti, & Rourke, 1995; Miller & Ozonoff, 2000). In contrast, 
literature on children with emotional and behavioural difficulties (EBD) suggests that 
these children are more likely to show the reverse pattern; that is, non-verbal better 
than verbal abilities (Plomin, Price, Eley, Dale, & Stevenson, 2002). It was predicted 
that children excluded from school who met criteria for ASD (henceforth ‘excluded 
+ ASD’) would show better verbal abilities compared to non-verbal abilities.
2.3.3 Attentional /  executive functioning.
Executive functioning is an umbrella term for high-level problem-solving behaviours 
usually thought to be under frontal lobe control (Duncan, 1986). It is a poorly 
specified term, but is thought to include processes such as focusing, sustaining and 
switching attention, forming abstract concepts, self-monitoring, and response 
inhibition. There is inconsistent evidence for executive dysfunction in higher- 
functioning individuals with ASD, with the most consistent finding being subtle 
deficits in attentional control / set-shifting (Liss et al., 2001). This contrasts with 
other developmental disorders in which executive dysfunction is pronounced. For
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example, children with ADHD show deficits in response inhibition (Goldberg et al., 
2005) and sustained attention (Manly, Robertson, Anderson, & Nimmo-Smith, 
1998). Children with CD also show deficits in inhibiting responses, although this 
may simply reflect comorbidity with ADHD (Hill, 2002). Executive dysfunction is 
often most apparent when the individual is faced with a novel, challenging task that 
requires rapid integration of information, such as tests of theory of mind. It was 
therefore considered crucial to include measures of attention and executive 
functioning so that the influence of these measures on social cognition / 
communication could be explored. It was not expected that the excluded group 
would show marked attentional / executive dysfunction. However, if deficits were 
present, it was predicted that the excluded group would be more likely to present 
with difficulties in attentional control / set-shifting but not with difficulties in 
response inhibition or sustained attention (consistent with an ASD profile), with 
these deficits most apparent in the excluded + ASD sub-group.
2.3.4 Pragmatic language.
Children with ASD show significantly poorer pragmatic language skills than those 
with ADHD (Guerts et al., 2004), CD or typically developing children (Gilmour et 
al., 2004). It was hypothesised that excluded children would present with 
significantly poorer pragmatic language skills than comparison children, consistent 
with previous research (Gilmour et al., 2004). It was predicted that a significant 
proportion of excluded children would have pragmatic difficulties similar in severity 
to those documented in ASD (e.g., Bishop & Baird, 2001; Geurts et al., 2004; 
Gilmour et al., 2004). It was expected that the excluded + ASD group would show
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the poorest pragmatic language skills followed by excluded children not meeting 
criteria for ASD, with typically developing children showing the best pragmatic 
language skills.
2.3.5 Social cognition.
A high percentage of individuals with ASD have difficulty recognising emotions 
from facial expression (Buitelaar, van der Wees, Swaab-Barneveld, & van der Gaag, 
1999; Campbell et al., 2006; Hobson, 1986) and from the eyes (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001). Specific difficulties recognising fear 
have been demonstrated in individuals with social communication deficits similar to 
autism (Lawrence, Kuntsi, Coleman, Campbell, & Skuse, 2003), and in individuals 
with ASD (Howard et al., 2000).
There is considerable debate regarding emotion recognition abilities in conduct 
disorder. Children with psychopathic traits present with specific deficits in 
recognising and responding to facial emotions of sadness and fear (Stevens, 
Charman, & Blair, 2001), however, children with conduct disorder without such 
traits do not show deficits in emotion recognition (Buitelaar et al., 1999). 
Inconsistency in the literature is likely to partly reflect difficulties with the reliability 
and validity of conduct disorder as a diagnosis (e.g., Lewis, Lewis, Unger, & 
Goldman, 1984), a complex issue that will not be discussed at length here. It is 
possible that emotion recognition deficits in conduct disorder can be accounted for 
by the presence of psychopathic traits. In contrast, children with ADHD tend to make 
random errors consistent with poor attentional skills, otherwise performing as well as
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typically developing children (Buitelaar et al., 1999).
These overlapping deficits may reflect genuine shared neurocognitive deficits and / 
or issues in how comorbidity is controlled within the literature. A recent study has 
established normative standards for recognition o f facial emotions for typically 
developing children aged 6-16 years (Lawrence, Bernstein et al., 2006) and 
demonstrated that reliable recognition occurs at very different ages for different 
emotions. It was predicted that excluded children would perform more poorly than 
comparisons, and significantly less well than would be predicted from normative 
data. It was predicted that differences between groups would be most apparent for 
recognition of fear, consistent with ASD literature. Furthermore, it was expected that 
the excluded + ASD group would present with the poorest emotion recognition 
abilities, compared to excluded children without ASD and typically developing 
children.
A high proportion of individuals with ASD also show deficits in face recognition 
memory (Dawson et al., 2002) and in judging direction of eye gaze from static 
photographs (Campbell et al., 2006). Furthermore, there is a close correlation 
between emotion recognition, theory of mind and gaze monitoring skills (Campbell 
et al., 2006; Lawrence, Campbell et al., 2003; Lawrence, Kuntsi et al., 2003). To date 
there are no studies demonstrating deficits in these areas in children with other 
psychiatric conditions. It was predicted that excluded children would perform more 
poorly than comparisons in both areas, with the excluded + ASD group presenting 
with the poorest scores.
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2.3.6 Theory o f  mind.
It has long been documented that individuals with ASD have deficits in theory of 
mind (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Performance on theory of mind 
tasks discriminates children with ASD from children with ADHD, CD and 
Oppositional Defiant Disorders (Buitelaar et al., 1999; Geurts et al., 2004). There are 
now several theory of mind tasks designed to explore mentalising abilities in higher- 
functioning children with ASD and typically developing children. One approach asks 
participants to describe short cartoons involving interactions between two triangles 
(Abell, Happe, & Frith, 2000). The task is sensitive to impairments in both adults and 
children with ASD (Campbell et al., 2006; Castelli, Happe, Frith, & Frith, 2000; 
Castelli, Frith, Happe & Frith, 2002). Individuals with ASD are able to use mental 
states to explain events in the animations, but are significantly poorer at giving 
appropriate mental state explanations. It was hypothesised that the excluded group 
would give significantly fewer appropriate mental state explanations than the 
comparison group, but that there would be no differences in the frequency of mental 
state terms used or in the ability to generate appropriate (non-mentalising) 
explanations. Children in the excluded + ASD group were expected to present with 
the lowest levels of appropriate mentalising, and perhaps also with idiosyncratic 
response styles. There is evidence that children and adults with significant social 
communication deficits tend to involve themselves in the narrative inappropriately 
(Kaland et al., 2005).
Recent work has focused on the relationship between attachment classification and 
mentalising abilities. Attachment theory emphasises the child’s bond to the caregiver
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as an explanatory framework for development and mental health. Evidence suggests 
there is considerable overlap between performance on advanced theory of mind tasks 
and quality of attachment in early adolescence (Humfress, O ’Connor, Slaughter, 
Target, & Fonagy, 2002). However, although some reports have suggested that ASD 
is associated with poorer attachment (e.g., Bakermans-Kranenburg, Rutgers, 
Willemsen-Swinkels, & Van Ijzendoom, 2003), meta-analysis suggests that this 
relationship is mediated by the presence of intellectual disability (Rutgers, 
Bakernmans-Kranenburg, van Ijzendoom, & van Berckelaer-Onnes, 2004). It was 
expected that children in both the excluded and comparison samples would vary in 
the quality of their attachment to caregivers. However, it was predicted that deficits 
in mentalising would not be explained solely in terms o f attachment quality, 
consistent with ASD literature.
2.4 Socio-demographic influences.
For all hypotheses, it was predicted that deficits in the excluded group could not be 
explained solely in terms of IQ or demographic variables known to be associated 
with exclusion from school. As noted earlier, disruptive behaviour is more common 
in males, particularly those of Afro-Caribbean origin, and in individuals with SEN. 
Disruptive behaviour and exclusion from school are both associated with a range of 
socio-economic variables (DfES, 2005). Although it has been repeatedly 
demonstrated that theory o f mind (e.g., Noble, Norman, & Farah, 2005) and 
pragmatic language skills (D. Bishop, personal communication, May 5, 2006) are 
independent of socio-economic status (SES), the groups of excluded and comparison 
children were carefully balanced on a range o f demographic and SES variables. Any
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deficits detected can then reliably be attributed to difficulties with social cognition, 
rather than to the non-specific effects of poverty and social deprivation.
2.5 Summary of hypotheses.
The current study therefore aimed to test the hypothesis that a sub-group of children 
excluded from primary school present with significant deficits in social cognition and 
social communication, of a nature and severity consistent with ASD. Specifically, it 
tested the following hypotheses:
1. Excluded children will be significantly more likely to meet criteria for ASD 
than typically developing comparison children.
2. Excluded children meeting criteria for ASD will show better verbal abilities 
compared to non-verbal abilities.
3. Excluded children will present with subtle deficits in attentional control / 
switching relative to comparisons. Excluded children meeting criteria for 
ASD will show the poorest attentional control / switching skills.
4. Excluded children will present with poorer pragmatic language skills, and be 
more likely to meet clinical cut-off, compared to comparisons. Children 
meeting criteria for ASD will show the poorest pragmatic language skills.
5. Excluded children will be significantly poorer at identifying facial 
expressions of emotion, compared to comparisons, with excluded children 
meeting criteria for ASD showing the poorest skills.
6. Excluded children will be significantly poorer at judging direction of eye 
gaze, and at face recognition memory, than comparisons. Excluded children
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meeting criteria for ASD show the poorest skills.
7. Excluded children will give significantly fewer appropriate mentalising 
responses than comparison children, with excluded children meeting criteria 
for ASD giving the fewest appropriate mentalising responses.
8. Deficits in social communication / social cognition amongst children 
excluded from school will not be accounted for by differences in IQ, SES or 
attachment.
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3.0 Method.
3.1 Ethical approval.
Ethical approval was obtained for this study from the Great Ormond Street Hospital 
for Children NHS Trust / Institute of Child Health Ethics Committee (Research and 
Development registration number 01BS09- see Appendix A for ethical approval, 
consent forms and information sheets). To comply with ethical principles, details of 
families were not known to the researchers unless the family contacted the project 
directly. Consent for participation was formally obtained at the start of the 
assessment. Where the primary caregiver was not the legal guardian, written consent 
was obtained from the legal guardian. Families were not paid for participation; 
however, all families were entered into a prize draw for vouchers.
3.2 Relationship to other research studies.
This research was part of a larger study investigating social communication skills in 
children excluded from school. All child neuropsychological data were collected by 
the author. Parent and teacher questionnaires were gathered jointly by the author and 
another researcher, whilst the diagnostic interviews were conducted by another 
researcher (see Donno, 2006).
3.3 Design.
An independent groups design was used to explore differences between children who
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had been excluded, or who were at risk of exclusion, and typically developing 
children not at risk of exclusion.
3.4 Power calculations.
Previous research using the Children’s Communication Checklist (Gilmour et al., 
2004) suggested an effect size of d = 1.7 between typically developing children and 
those at risk o f exclusion. A conservative estimate was adopted (<d = 0.9), as the 
effect sizes for other measures of social cognition in children excluded from school 
were unknown. At alpha = .05, this meant that 26 participants would be required in 
each group to enable sufficient statistical power to detect effects (Cohen, 1992).
3.5 Recruitment process.
Children and their families were recruited over a period of twelve months from 
primary schools in a deprived London borough. Approximately one third of the 
population in the borough are from ethnic minority backgrounds, with around 25% 
from African or Caribbean backgrounds. 33% of households are headed by a lone 
parent (compared to 22% nationally) and over a third of households are dependent on 
income support. Over 50% of primary age children speak English as an additional 
language (EAL), and over 58% are eligible for free school meals (Office for National 
Statistics, 2001). The borough experiences high levels o f crime, social housing and 
mental health problems. Considering these multiple risk factors, it is unsurprising 
that the borough experiences amongst the highest rates of exclusion from primary 
school in London, with 5% of primary age pupils permanently excluded (DfES,
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2002). However, many schools use ‘unofficial’ exclusions, asking parents to keep 
children at home for a few days without formal sanction (Hallam et al., 2005). It was 
therefore not possible to ascertain how many children were considered at risk of 
exclusion at the time o f the study.
The process of recruitment is shown in Figure 1. Initially, all mainstream primary 
schools in the borough (TV = 56) and the local Pupil Referral Unit (PRU) were 
contacted with details of the study and invited to participate. Sixteen schools 
participated, representing 26% of schools in the borough. This included one school 
for children with EBD, and one school for children with mild learning disabilities1.
Participating schools were provided with information packs to pass to families with 
children who had been excluded from school, or were currently considered at risk of 
exclusion from school. The definition of ‘at risk’ is known to vary considerably 
between schools, with no clear relationship between particular challenging 
behaviours and exclusion (Hallam et al., 2005). Schools were asked to recruit only 
those children at high risk of exclusion whose disruptive behaviour had been of 
concern over time (rather than in isolated incidents).
The same schools were invited to recruit comparison children. Teachers were 
provided with details of particular age, ethnicity and ability levels o f children sought 
as comparisons, and passed on information packs to families with appropriate 
children. Due to relatively slow recruitment in this phase, the researchers also visited 
several schools at the end o f the school day to speak directly with parents. Group
1 These schools provided teacher questionnaire data for children initially recruited through the PRU 
and subsequently placed at the school. They did not actively recruit participants.
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membership was defined by teacher report.
3.6 Participants.
3.6.1 Exclusion criteria.
Children were excluded from either group if there was a known history of global 
learning disability or if their FSIQ fell below 70. Children and families were also 
excluded from the study if either the child or caregiver was not fluent in English, 
because of the emphasis on pragmatic language skills. Children aged less than 6 
years were excluded due to the absence of normative data for the measures selected.
3.6.2 Excluded group.
Twenty-six children (23 males, 3 females) at risk of exclusion participated in the 
study. Children ranged between 6 and 13 years of age, and were diverse in terms of 
intellectual ability and ethnicity. Seven (27%) of these families were recruited 
through the PRU, with the remainder from mainstream schools. 15 (58%) had a 
known history of permanent or fixed term exclusions, the most serious categories of 
exclusion from school. Detailed demographics are shown in Tables 1-3.
Reasons for children being at risk of exclusion were sought from teachers, and 
provided for 14 children. Reasons given included previous history of fixed term or 
permanent exclusion (35%), persistent disruptive behaviour (29%), physical assault 
towards teachers or pupils (50%), and verbal abuse towards teachers and pupils
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(29%).2 The sample therefore represents the range of behaviours most commonly 
given as reasons for exclusion (DfES, 2005).
3.6.3 Comparison group.
Twenty-two typically developing children (18 males, 4 females) not at risk of 
exclusion were recruited as comparisons. Children ranged between 6 and 12 years, 
and showed similar diversity in intellectual ability and ethnicity to the excluded 
group. All of these children were attending mainstream schools, were not currently 
considered at risk of exclusion by teachers, and had never been excluded from 
school. Their demographics are shown in Tables 1-3.
3.6.4 Group balancing.
There were no statistically significant differences between the groups in age (^(46) = 
-0.45, ns) or gender 0f2(l, N =  48) = 0.42, ns). There were no differences in verbal IQ 
(/(46) = -1.59, ns). The groups differed in non-verbal IQ (/(46) = -3.32, p < .01) and 
overall IQ (/(46) = -2.65, p < .05), with the comparison group performing at a higher 
level than the excluded group.
Participants were compared in terms of ethnicity and indices of SES, as these have 
been shown to correlate with frequency of disruptive behaviour (see Tables 2 and 3). 
There were no statistically significant differences between groups in terms of 
ethnicity (x2 (2, N  = 48) = 0.72, ns). Groups did not differ in terms of housing type
2 Multiple reasons were provided for each child.
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(council vs. private; x  (3, 48) = 5.67, ns) frequency of single parent / carers ix
(1, N  = 48) = 1.34, ns) and frequency of EAL ( j2 (1, N  = 48) = 1.50, ns). Statistically 
significant differences were observed on employment status of the primary caregiver 
(employed vs. unemployed; x  (1, N  = 48) = 7.29, p < .01) with higher rates of 
unemployment in the excluded group. Parents of children in the excluded group had 
completed significantly fewer years of education than parents of comparison children 
ix (2, N  = 48) = 16.62, p < .001).
As would be expected, families of excluded children were more likely to have had 
contact with social services {x 0> N =  48) = 25.37, p < .001). Past or current child 
protection concerns (as reported by the primary caregiver) were more likely in the 
excluded group {x (1, N  = 48) = 18.46, p < .001), as was a history o f contact with 
Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services / Child and Family Consultation 
Services ix (C N  = 48) = 12.08, p < .001)3. These differences provide an index of 
the severity of the behavioural problems presented by the excluded children.
3.7 Measures.
A battery of measures was completed with each child to assess a range of social 
communication abilities, as well as intellectual abilities, pragmatic language skills 
and executive functioning.
3 None o f  these children had been (or were waiting to be) assessed for social communication  
difficulties prior to participating in the research.
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3.7.1 Developmental and diagnostic information.
The Developmental, Diagnostic and Dimensional Interview (3di; Skuse et al., 2004) 
was completed with the primary caregiver. This computerised psychiatric interview 
uses parental and teacher report to assess for the presence of ICD-10 developmental 
and psychiatric disorders. An abbreviated version was administered to evaluate 
diagnoses of ASD, Hyperkinesis4 and CD, and to screen for the presence of 
attachment difficulties. This includes questions about the child’s response to 
separation and willingness to explore new environments. The 3di shows excellent 
test-retest and inter-rater reliabilities (most intraclass correlation coefficients > 0.90) 
and distinguishes almost perfectly between individuals with ASD and typically 
developing comparisons (Skuse et al., 2004).
3.7.2 Intellectual functioning.
Intellectual abilities were measured using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of 
Intelligence (WASI- Wechsler, 1999). This abbreviated measure o f intellectual 
functioning provides measures of overall ability (Full Scale IQ- FSIQ), verbal ability 
(Verbal IQ- VIQ) and non-verbal ability (Performance IQ-PIQ). It shows excellent 
test-retest reliability (FSIQ .92) and discriminates well between individuals with 
global learning disabilities and typically developing individuals (Wechsler, 1999).
4 ICD-10 criteria for Hyperkinesis encompass the DSM-IV disorder ADHD; the two terms are used 
interchangeably here.
69
3.7.3 Attentional /  executive functioning.
Attention and executive functions were assessed using the Test o f Everyday 
Attention for Children (TEA-Ch; Manly et al., 1998). This comprehensive battery 
provides measures o f selective and sustained attention plus attentional control / 
switching across both auditory and visual domains. Raw scores are translated into 
scaled scores between 1 and 19 (M = 10, SD = 3). Scaled scores falling below 7 are 
usually considered impaired. The measure has good test-retest reliability (r ranging 
.57 to .87) and construct validity, showing high correlations with existing measures 
of attention / executive functioning (e.g., Stroop Colour Word Test- Golden, 1978). 
The TEA-Ch was designed to minimise the impact of overall intellectual functioning 
on performance, and most subtests are independent of IQ (with the exception of 
Creature Counting, Map Mission, Walk Don’t Walk and Code Transmission, which 
show significant correlations with FSIQ in the range .17- .31). It discriminates well 
between children with ADHD and typically developing comparisons, with children 
with ADHD performing more poorly on virtually all subtests even when overall 
intellectual ability is controlled statistically (Manley et al., 1998).
3.7.4 Pragmatic language.
The Children’s Communication Checklist (CCC; Bishop, 1998) was used as a 
measure of pragmatic language skills. This 70-item checklist was developed to 
distinguish between children with specific language impairment and children with 
pragmatic language difficulties. For each item, the rater is asked to indicate whether 
this ‘does not apply’, ‘applies somewhat’ or ‘definitely applies’. The CCC yields a
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number of subscale scores covering both structural and social aspects of language, 
with means and standard deviations established for typically developing populations 
as well as clinical groups (Bishop & Baird, 2001). Descriptions of the subscales and 
associated means can be found in Table 4. Of particular relevance to this study is the 
Pragmatic Composite scale. This includes ratings of inappropriate initiation, 
coherence, stereotyped language, use of context and rapport, and therefore provides 
an overall index of pragmatic language abilities. CCC subscales show high internal 
consistency, with alpha values ranging from .54 to .92, highest for the Pragmatic 
Composite. Whilst inter-rater reliability is only moderate (Pearson correlations 
ranging from .30 to .64), this is based on correlations between teacher and parent 
ratings (Bishop & Baird, 2001). Differences in ratings are to be expected when 
examining behaviours that are context specific. The CCC is sensitive to clinical 
levels of impairment, being able to distinguish reliably between different language 
and developmental disorders (Bishop & Baird, 2001; Geurts et al., 2004). It is also 
specific to language difficulties, discriminating well between children with 
internalising and externalising disorders and those with pragmatic language 
impairments (Gilmour et al., 2004).
The lower a child’s score on the CCC, the greater the level of impairment. 
Significant clinical impairment was defined as CCC scores falling at least 3 SD 
below the population mean, on subscales or the Pragmatic Composite. This is a 
somewhat conservative criterion; however, it has previously been shown to provide 
the most reliable discrimination between children with pragmatic language disorders 
and other language / developmental disorders (Bishop & Baird, 2001). Since ASD is 
associated with particularly low scores on the Pragmatic Composite (Geurts et al.,
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2004), it was considered crucial to adopt this stringent criterion in order to minimise 
the risk of incorrectly classifying children as impaired.
3.7.5 Social cognition.
Social cognition was assessed using the Schedules for the Assessment of Social 
Intelligence (SASI), a set of computerised measures of social cognition sensitive to 
deficits shown by individuals with ASD (Campbell et al., 2006; Dawson et al., 2002; 
Lawrence, Bernstein et al., 2006; Lawrence, Campbell, Bernstein, Pearson, & Skuse, 
2006; Skuse, Lawrence & Tang, 2005). All tasks show excellent test-retest reliability 
and discriminate well between children with autism and typically developing 
children (Skuse et al., 2005). Before commencing each task, a check was made to 
ensure the child could read and understand the response options and use the 
computer adequately (if not, assistance was provided as needed). The tasks are as 
follows:
• Facial expression recognition: a series of faces displaying emotional 
expressions were developed for the SASI in collaboration with Paul Ekman 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1971). The facial images used show high inter-rater 
agreement (70 to 100%- Ekman & Friesen, 1976). 60 faces are presented, ten 
each of fear, anger, disgust, sadness, happiness and surprise. Each child was 
first asked to define these emotions (‘what does it mean to be happy / when 
might you be happy?’) and then shown six practice faces. The six emotion 
terms were presented at the side of each face. Scores are obtained for the 
number of correct answers for each emotion separately.
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• Gaze monitoring skills: this is a novel computerised task measuring accuracy 
in detection of eye-gaze from a static photograph, with eyes deviated 
between 5 and 20 degrees from directly at the viewer. Children are presented 
with 30 faces (15 male, 15 female) and asked to indicate where the person is 
looking by clicking on the appropriate button (‘to my left’, ‘into my eyes’, 
‘to my right’). Scores are obtained for the percentage o f correct responses.
• Face Recognition Memory: the Recognition Memory Test- Faces 
(Warrington, 1984) was presented in an automated format. This widely used 
test requires encoding, memory storage, and decoding of facial images. 
Children were presented with 50 black and white photographs of men and 
asked to decide whether the face was ‘nice’ or ‘not nice’ by clicking on a 
button. Each child was then presented with 50 pairs of photographs- one 
photograph previously seen, and one distracter. Children were asked to click 
on the button underneath the face they had already seen. Scores are obtained 
for total number of correctly recognised faces.
3.7.6 Theory o f mind.
As described in Castelli et al. (2002), this task explores the ability to attribute 
intentions and mental states to contingent movements, and discriminates well 
between children with ASD and typically developing children (Abell et al., 2000). 
Children viewed eight short animations involving two triangles and were asked to 
describe what was happening in the cartoon. Encouragement and other non-specific 
prompts were given as needed but no other instructions provided. Two different
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types of animation were presented: four shown to elicit mentalising responses 
(coaxing, tricking, mocking, surprising), and four shown to elicit goal-directed 
responses (fighting, leading, chasing, and dancing) as defined by Abell et al. (2000). 
Responses were recorded and later transcribed for analysis. Responses were coded 
for degree o f intentionality (range 0-5, where 0 indicates no intentional language and 
5 elaborate use), appropriateness (range 0-2, where 0 indicates an inappropriate or 
unrelated description of events, and 2 an accurate description), and length (range 0-4, 
ranging from no response to four or more clauses). Two researchers rated all 
transcripts independently. Inter-rater agreement was high (intentionality 87%; 
appropriateness 86%; length 98%). Discrepancies were discussed between raters and 
a final score agreed, in all cases adopting the more conservative rating. From these 
ratings, responses were classified as reflecting an Action response (intentionality 
rating of 1), an Interaction response (intentionality rating of 2 or 3), or a Mentalising 
response (intentionality ratings of 4 or 5). Finally, the number of appropriate 
mentalising responses were calculated by summing the number of mentalising 
responses awarded an appropriateness rating of 1 or 2.
3.8 Procedure.
Prior to the assessment, each family received a pack of questionnaires including the 
CCC, hyperkinesis and conduct scales. These were directly added to the 3di prior to 
completing the rest of the interview if available beforehand. If not, these questions 
were included as a routine part of the 3di interview. The same questionnaires were 
sent to the child’s class teacher once consent was obtained to contact their school. 
Families were assessed in their own homes, except for one excluded child and one
74
comparison child seen at school by parental request. Caregiver and child were seen 
concurrently in separate rooms.
Measures were administered in the same fixed order throughout (WASI, SASI, TEA- 
Ch). The animations were presented in a random order. Children were given short 
breaks after each set o f tasks or as requested, with a longer break imposed before the 
administration o f the TEA-Ch. This was standardised for all children, with the 
exception o f one excluded child who was administered the TEA-Ch in a separate 
session due to withdrawal of assent during the first assessment. The battery of 
measures took between 2 Vi and 3 hours to complete including breaks.
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4.0 Results.
4.1 Assumptions of parametric statistics.
All variables were examined to ensure that the basic assumptions of parametric 
statistics were met.
4.1.1 Outliers.
One excluded child (case 18) was identified as a significant outlier on PIQ with an 
extremely high score of 136; however, removing his data from analysis did not affect 
the pattern of findings. Furthermore, this child was clinically significant, in that he 
met ICD-10 criteria for atypical autism. There are many examples of extremely high- 
functioning individuals in the literature (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Stone, & 
Rutherford, 1999) and so his data were retained for analysis. There were outliers 
identified on recognition of happy expressions (cases 6, 18 and 20), fear (case 16), 
and anger (case 18). Removing these data did not affect the pattern of results and 
therefore they were retained for analysis. No other outliers were identified.
4.1.2 Normality.
There were minor concerns about normality in some variables; however, these were 
largely on measures such as the CCC subscales that are designed to be skewed. 
Wherever concerns were identified, non-parametric statistics were also completed to 
check the pattern of findings.
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4.2 Statistical approach.
As noted earlier, the excluded and comparison groups were balanced for VIQ, age, 
gender, ethnicity and most measures of SES. However, there were significant 
differences between groups in PIQ, with excluded children performing less well than 
comparisons, and in education and occupation of the main carer. Occupation is a 
common measure of SES; however, in this sample many carers were working in 
lower-skilled occupations than would be expected from their education level, largely 
as a result of immigration affecting their ability to work in their profession. 
Furthermore, the numbers in each group did not allow for meaningful coding (e.g., 
using the Standard Occupational Classification- Office for National Statistics, 2000). 
The groups were balanced on many other indices of SES including frequency of 
single carers and proportion in social housing, both of which provide strong 
measures of social deprivation. Education of the primary carer was thought to be a 
more valid and reliable indicator than occupation in this sample, and would be 
expected to relate to neurocognitive development via parent-child interactions 
(Hauser, 1994).
A conservative approach was therefore adopted. Significant differences are reported 
here only if parametric and non-parametric analyses produced the same pattern of 
findings, and regression analyses indicated a significant independent effect of group 
after controlling for the effects of PIQ and education of carer.
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4.3 Diagnoses.
ICD-10 diagnoses for ASD, CD and Hyperkinesis were obtained from the 3di 
interviews with parents (Donno, 2006). Nine children in the excluded group met 
criteria for ASD (Autism, Atypical Autism, Asperger Syndrome or PDD-NOS) 
compared to none of the comparisons. This difference reached statistical significance 
(x2 (1, A^= 48) = 9.37, p < 0.01). All these children also met criteria for CD, and one 
for hyperkinesis.
Three children in the excluded group presented with attachment difficulties whilst no 
child in the comparison group showed such difficulties; this did not reach statistical 
significance ix (1, N =  48) = 2.71, ns). Two of the children who met criteria for ASD 
presented with attachment difficulties.
The excluded + ASD sub-group is too small for meaningful statistical analyses; 
however, trends in their neurocognitive profile will be reported, using effect sizes 
(Cohen, 1988) where appropriate to illustrate the magnitude of the difference 
between groups. Table 5 shows the demographics and neurocognitive profiles for the 
nine children meeting criteria for ASD, in addition to sub-group means and SDs. 
Means and SDs of the typically developing group are shown for comparison 
purposes.
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4.4 Intellectual functioning.
The WASI was used as a measure of intellectual functioning. As noted earlier, no 
between group differences were observed for VIQ, whilst the comparison group 
performed significantly better on PIQ. Group differences in PIQ were accounted for 
by significant differences on both the Block Design (7(46) = -2.63, p < .05) and 
Matrix Reasoning subtests (^(46) = -3.46, p < .001). No differences were seen on 
either subtest contributing to VIQ- Vocabulary (t(46) = -1.43, ns) or Similarities 
(t(46) = -1.49, ns). A significant VIQ > PIQ discrepancy was observed in the 
excluded group 0(25) = 2.99, p < .01), but not in the comparison group 0(21) = 0.41, 
ns).
The excluded + ASD group showed intellectual functioning within the normal range, 
with VIQ ranging from 80 to 142 (M=  106.11, SD = 18.67) and PIQ ranging from 72 
to 136 (M = 98.22, SD = 18.28- see Table 5). Performance was reasonably similar 
across all subtests contributing to IQ (Vocabulary M  = 48.78, SD = 11.86; 
Similarities M  = 56.78, SD = 13.07; Block Design M  = 48.44, SD = 11.09; Matrix 
Reasoning M -  48.56, SD = 12.24). Nonetheless, a trend for VIQ > PIQ was apparent 
(d=  0.43, medium effect5).
4.5 Attention / executive functioning.
The TEA-Ch was used as a measure of attention and executive functioning. Means 
and SDs are shown in Table 6 for subtests and factor scores. Data from one child in
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the excluded group (case 8) was removed from analysis as his performance on the 
tasks suggested he did not comprehend the instructions sufficiently for this to be a 
valid measure6. Another child in the excluded group (case 14) withdrew assent for 
participation partway through administration, and therefore scores are available for 6 
of 13 subtests only. Two children in the excluded group (cases 22 and 24) and one in 
the comparison group (case 32) declined to complete the final subtest (Code 
Transmission). Data were not obtained for one further child in the excluded group 
(case 20) for Score DT due to stopwatch failure during testing.
Factor scores were derived by summing scaled scores as described in the TEA-Ch 
manual (Manley et al., 1998). The selective attention factor comprised scaled scores 
for Sky Search Attention Score and Map Mission. The sustained attention factor 
included scores from Score, Code Transmission, Walk Don’t Walk, Score DT and 
Sky Search DT. Finally, the attentional control / switching factor comprised scores 
from Creature Counting (timing score) and Opposite Worlds. The Creature Counting 
Timing score is only calculated if the raw accuracy score exceeds 3; this was the case 
for 13 of 26 excluded children and 18 of 22 comparison children. Inspection of the 
means and SDs showed that children excluded from school tended to perform less 
well on all factor scores than comparisons (see Table 6). However, none of these 
differences reached statistical significance.
Significant differences were observed between groups on the Sky Search Target
5 This effect size uses the original standard deviations to calculate d. Alternative approaches use the 
paired t statistic; however, this potentially overestimates the effect size (Dunlop, Cortina, Vaslow,
& Burke, 1996) and so a conservative approach was adopted.
6 This child had a FSIQ o f  73 (95% confidence interval: 68-80). Following the assessment he was 
referred to Educational Psychology services to determine whether his needs could be met in 
mainstream school.
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(7(45) = -2.56, p < .05), Creature Counting Total (7(45) = -2.43, p < .05), Score DT 
(f(45) = -2.20, p < .05) and Opposite World subtests (/(44) = -3.16, p < .01). No 
difference between groups was seen on the Creature Counting Timing Score- 
however, as noted earlier, this score can only be calculated if the raw accuracy scores 
exceed 3. Chi-square analyses revealed that comparison children were significantly 
more likely to have a timing score calculated than excluded children (x ( \ ,N =  48) = 
4.20, p < .05), reflecting better performance by the typically developing group. A 
number of TEA-Ch subscales are known to correlate with VIQ, notably the Creature 
Counting subtest (Manley et al., 1998). VIQ was therefore included in regression 
analyses where a significant correlation was observed (Sky Search Target r = .33, p < 
.05; Creature Counting Total r -  .31, p < .05; Score DT r = .57, p < .001; Opposite 
World r = .38, p < .05). PIQ and education of carer were also included as described 
earlier. Group remained a significant independent predictor on Opposite World (J3 = 
2.27, /(41) = 2.45, p < .05) but not on the other subtests.
Children in the excluded + ASD group performed extremely poorly on subtests 
contributing to the attentional control / switching factor. It was not possible to 
calculate the Creature Counting Timing Score for three of the children due to their 
poor overall performance on this task. Furthermore, their performance on the 
opposite world subtest was also poor (M = 6.56, SD = 2.92). The magnitude of 
difference in mean between this sub-group and the comparison group on the 
Opposite World subtest was large (d=  1.10, large effect).
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4.6 Pragmatic language.
The CCC was used as a measure of pragmatic language and obtained from teachers 
for 25 of 26 excluded children and 21 of 22 comparison children, and from parents 
for all children.
No significant differences were observed between parent and teacher ratings on 
subscales or the Pragmatic Composite. Furthermore, the pragmatic composite scores 
were moderately strongly correlated (r = .45, p < .01). Parent ratings are more 
closely linked to diagnosis (Bishop & Baird, 2001) and so only the parent data are 
presented here for brevity7.
Means and SDs for subscales and the pragmatic composite are shown in Table 7. 
Considering the large number of parametric tests conducted on this measure, the 
more stringent significance level of p < .001 was adopted. As shown in the table, 
excluded children performed more poorly on the Pragmatic Composite (t(46) = -7.38, 
p < .001) and on many of the sub-scales (Inappropriate Initiation- /(46) = -4.88, p < 
.001; Coherence- /(46) = -5.32, p < .001; Use of Context- /(46) = -7.44, p < .001; 
Rapport- t(46) = -5.63, p < .001; Social Relationships- ^(46) = -6.48, p < .001). No 
significant differences were observed on subscales measuring intelligibility / fluency 
(/(46) = -1.26, ns), syntax (/(46) = -2.33, ns), stereotyped language (/(46) = -3.38, ns) 
or interests (/(46) = -1.38, ns).8
7 Teacher data are shown in Appendix B.
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Clinically significant impairment was defined as any score falling more than 3 SD 
below the mean of the subscale or composite. Chi-square analyses were used to 
explore whether children excluded from school were more likely to fall within the 
clinical range than comparisons. Significant between group differences were seen for 
Coherence ( /2 (1, N  = 48) = 15.09, p < .001), Use of Context ( j 2 (1, N  = 48) = 15.09, 
p < .001), Social Relationships ( j2 (1, N =  48) = 13.54, p < .001) and the Pragmatic 
Composite (1, N  = 48) = 12.08, p < .001). 42% of the excluded group showed 
Pragmatic Composite scores within the clinical range, compared to 0% in the 
comparison group.
The excluded + ASD group showed extremely poor pragmatic language abilities (M  
= 129.33, SD = 11.65; see Table 5). The sub-group mean fell more than 3 SD below 
population means and more than 3 SD below the mean of the comparison group. Six 
children fell more than 3 SD below the mean and a further two fell more than 2 SD 
below the mean. The magnitude of difference in mean between this group and the 
comparison group was very large indeed (d = 2.53). An effect size of this magnitude 
indicates that the average child in the comparison group performed above the 97.7th 
percentile o f the excluded + ASD group (Cohen, 1988).
4.7 Social cognition.
4.7.1 Emotion recognition.
Means and SD for proportion of correct answers were calculated for each emotion,
8 No between group differences were noted for the proportion o f  children with EAL. Furthermore, 
EAL did not correlate significantly with the pragmatic composite (r = .11, ns). Differences in the
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and shown in Table 8. Children excluded from school tended to be less accurate in 
identifying emotions from facial expressions. However, no significant differences 
were seen between groups on any emotion. Raw scores were also converted to z- 
scores using age and gender stratified normative data from Lawrence, Campbell et al. 
(2006) in order to explore whether these children were significantly poorer at 
emotion recognition than would be expected in the general population.9 One-sample 
/-tests revealed that excluded children were significantly poorer at recognising happy 
expressions compared to normative data (/(25) = -2.48, p < .05), with no other 
significant differences identified.
The z-scores for recognition of fear and happiness in the excluded + ASD group are 
shown in Table 5. An advantage was observed for comparison children in 
recognising fear (d  = 0.43, medium effect) and happiness (d = 0.90, large effect). 
This trend is also seen for other facial emotions, with the exception of disgust in 
which children meeting criteria for ASD perform slightly better than comparisons.
4.7.2 Eye gaze monitoring.
Means and SD were calculated for the proportion of correct responses, and are shown 
in Table 9. Children excluded from school tended to perform more poorly on this 
task than comparisons (/(46) = -2.65, p < .05). However, there was no independent 
effect of group once PIQ and education of carer were entered into a regression 
analysis (J3= 5.89, /(44) = 1.90, ns).
pragmatic composite cannot therefore be attributed to EAL.
9 Normative data are reproduced with permission in Appendix C.
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Following the approach of Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, and Plumb 
(2001), the highest score that could reasonably be obtained by chance was calculated. 
This score reflects the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval around chance 
scores. Thirty trials with three response options (p[correct] = 0.3) means that scores 
in excess of 13 (43% correct) are unlikely to occur simply by chance. One-sample t- 
tests were conducted to explore whether scores by excluded and comparison children 
were significantly different from chance. Comparison children showed scores 
significantly better than chance (/(21) = 4.77, p < .001), whilst the scores of children 
excluded from school were not significantly different from chance (/(25) = 1.75, ns). 
Thirteen of the excluded children performed at equal or less than chance level, 
compared to just four of the comparisons. This reached statistical significance {y2 (1, 
N  = 48) = 5.27, p < .05).
The excluded + ASD sub-group performed poorly on this task (M = 47.41, SD = 
9.40) and more poorly than comparison children (d = 0.57, medium effect). Four of 
the children showed Eye Gaze scores at or below chance level (see Table 5).
4.7.3 Face recognition memory.
Means and SDs were derived for the proportion of correctly recognised faces (shown 
in Table 9). Data was not available for one comparison child due to technical 
difficulties with the computer during administration. Although children excluded 
from school tended to recognise fewer faces than comparisons, this difference was 
not statistically significant (/(45) = -1.11, ns). Chance performance on this task is 
reflected in scores equal to or less than 31 (62%). Both excluded children (^(25) =
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2.32, p < .05) and comparison children (?(20) = 3.58, p < .01) showed scores 
significantly better than chance level. There were no differences in the number of 
children in each group falling at or below chance level (x2 (1, N =  48) = 0.51, ns).
The excluded + ASD group performed well on this task (M  = 72.94, SD = 9.38), 
slightly better than the comparison group (see Table 5). However, the magnitude of 
the difference between this sub-group and the comparison group was very small (d = 
0.20, small effect).
4.8 Theory of mind.
Animations were compared in terms of the frequency of mentalising responses. 
Significantly more mentalising responses were given to animations designed to elicit 
mentalising responses, e.g., ‘The little triangle tricked him’, compared to those 
designed to elicit goal-directed responses, e.g., ‘The little triangle pushed him’ (/(47) 
= -3.57, p < .001). This supports the sensitivity of this task in measuring mentalising 
abilities in children.
There were no significant differences between groups in the frequency of mentalising 
responses given, either to goal-directed (/(46) = -1.22, ns) or mentalising animations 
(/(46) = -1.95, ns). However, there were significant differences in the frequency of 
appropriate mentalising responses, defined as the total number o f responses receiving 
1 or 2 point scores on appropriateness and 4 or 5 point scores on intentionality 
ratings. These data are shown in Table 9. Children excluded from school gave 
significantly fewer appropriate mentalising responses than comparisons (/(46) = -
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2.18, p < .05). No significant correlations were seen between appropriate mentalising 
and VIQ (r = .12, ns), PIQ (r = .18, ns), age (r = .10, ns), attentional control / 
switching (r = .06, ns), education of carer ( a * = .17, ns) or attachment quality (r = -.12, 
ns).
Children in the excluded + ASD group showed poor mentalising abilities, with two 
children giving no appropriate mentalising responses at all. The magnitude of 
difference in mean appropriate mentalising between this sub-group and the 
comparisons was moderate (d = 0.61, medium effect). One child in the excluded + 
ASD group (case 12) responded in an extremely unusual manner to this task, 
switching between third-person and first-person accounts of the events. For example:
[Animation no. 5: Big triangle and little triangle are fighting.]
Pushing each other left and right, left and right, uh, uh oh pop! [singing 
and humming]. The little one out of the way and push the, er, big one 
stop fighting and get off me, get off me... stop it leave me alone, you 
ugly monster. Errrrr [unarticulated vocalisations] Big punching one no 
stop it. Don’t push me I’ll push you. Don’t push me I’ll push you.
[Animation no. 7: Little triangle tricks big triangle.]
They’re fighting. Get off me. Um poke me get away I want to go back to 
school. Don’t poke me get off me. Stop fighting. Thank you I ’m going 
now. Shame on you, you can’t fight.
No child in either the excluded or comparison groups showed a similar response
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style.
4.9 Relationship between measures of social cognition.
Correlation analyses were conducted to explore the relationships between measures 
of social cognition. Significant correlations were observed between recognition of 
surprised and angry expressions (r = .34, p < .05) and between angry and sad 
expressions (r = .33 > P < .05). Recognition of angry faces correlated significantly 
with performance on the Eye Gaze task (r = .34, p < .05). Finally, recognition of 
fearful facial expressions correlated significantly with frequency of appropriate 
mentalising responses (r = .37, p < .01), and frequency of mentalising responses 
given to mentalising animations (r = .44, p < .01), but not with frequency of 
mentalising responses given to goal-directed animations (r = -.01, ns). No other 
significant correlations were observed.10
4.10 Predicting exclusion and ASD status.
The pragmatic composite, eye gaze, recognition of happy and fearful faces, and 
appropriate mentalising scores were summed to create the Social Communication 
Index (SCI). These measures were selected on the basis of significant between group 
differences and / or theoretical relevance to ASD. Lower scores indicate poorer 
social communication skills. Means and SDs are shown in Table 10. Children 
excluded from school showed significantly lower scores than comparisons (/(46) = - 
6.87, p < .001). This difference held even when the pragmatic composite score was
10 With alpha = .05 and 64 correlations calculated, three significant results would be expected by 
chance. All correlations were planned. It is therefore unlikely that these results reflect Type I error.
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removed from the SCI, and PIQ and education of the carer controlled (/? = 6.86, /(44) 
= 2.12, p < .05). Just 12% of excluded children showed SCI scores higher than 
195.20 (1 SD below the comparison group mean), compared to 82% of comparison 
children. This difference was statistically significant (x (3, N  = 48) = 24.67, p < 
.001 ).
The excluded + ASD group showed amongst the poorest SCI scores. Three children 
fell more than 1 SD below, three more than 2 SD below, and one more than 3 SD 
below the comparison group mean. The magnitude of difference in means compared 
to the comparison group was extremely large indeed (d = 2.09, large effect). An 
effect size of this magnitude indicates that the average child in the comparison group 
performs above the 97.7th percentile of the excluded + ASD group (Cohen, 1988).
4.10.1 Predicting exclusion status.
Logistical regression analyses indicated that the SCI predicted exclusion status 
significantly better than would be expected by chance ( j2 (3, N  = 48) = 34.78, p < 
.001) and remained a significant independent predictor even after controlling PIQ 
and education of carer {Wald{ 1) = 10.85, p < .001). SCI correctly classified 83.3 % 
of children as excluded or not excluded.
4.10.2 Predicting ASD diagnosis.
The SCI correlated very highly with ASD diagnosis (r = -.41, p < .01). Logistic 
regression analyses indicated that the SCI predicted diagnosis significantly better
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than would be expected by chance Of2 (1, N  = 48) = 9.42, p < .05) and remained a 
significant predictor even after controlling PIQ and education of carer {Wald{ 1) = 
5.80, p < .05). SCI correctly classified 81.3% of children as meeting or not meeting 
criteria for ASD.11
11 When measures o f  attentional control / switching were included in the SCI, the independent effect 
o f  SCI on exclusion and A SD  status was reduced, and the proportion o f  children correctly classified  
was also reduced. They were therefore not included in the composite.
5.0 Discussion.
This study tested the hypothesis that a sub-group of children excluded from school 
show significant social communication difficulties, examining intellectual ability, 
pragmatic language, social cognition, attention and executive functioning, as well as 
psychiatric diagnosis. The findings from each area will be reviewed separately, 
before considering the implications of these findings for theory, and educational and 
clinical practice.
5.1 Diagnoses.
All children were evaluated against ICD-10 criteria for ASD, CD and Hyperkinesis. 
Nine children in the excluded group met criteria for ASD, nearly 35% of the sample. 
All of these children also met criteria for CD, and one for Hyperkinesis. It was 
striking that the gender ratio of this sub-group (8 males, 1 female) closely mirrored 
gender ratios reported for high-functioning ASD in clinical populations (e.g., 
Harrison, O’Hare, Campbell, Adamson, & McNeillage, 2006). Diagnosis of ASD 
was strongly associated with performance on a composite measure of social 
cognition / communication (SCI), which correctly classified over 81% of children. 
Although there are clearly difficulties in predicting classification with such small 
sub-samples, none of the excluded + ASD group had been previously assessed for 
social communication or other neurodevelopmental difficulties. The ability to 
discriminate these children from the wider conduct-disordered population therefore 
has considerable clinical utility. It is likely that a distinct sub-group o f children with
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conduct problems also experience clinically significant social communication 
difficulties, and potentially have an ASD.
5.2 Intellectual functioning.
Children excluded from school showed IQ scores across the full range of normal 
intellectual ability (FSIQ ranging from 73 to 144). VIQ was significantly higher than 
PIQ, whereas no differences between VIQ and PIQ were observed in the comparison 
group. Children excluded from school showed significantly poorer PIQ than 
comparisons, with differences noted on both the Block Design and Matrix Reasoning 
subtests. The sub-group of children meeting criteria for ASD showed IQ scores 
ranging from borderline to extremely high, with a tendency for VIQ to be somewhat 
higher than PIQ (statistically significant in the excluded group as a whole). This may 
help to explain why their difficulties are not detected, since the majority of scores fall 
within the average range. Such children may be able to compensate for their 
difficulties with social communication using their verbal abilities. This pattern of 
performance is consistent with high-functioning ASD profiles (Klin et al., 1995; 
Miller & Ozonoff, 2000), but not with EBD profiles, where the opposite pattern of 
scores is commonly observed (Plomin et al., 2002).
5.3 Attentional / executive functioning.
Children excluded from school showed remarkably comparable skills in attention / 
executive functions compared to peers. Differences observed on subtests of the TEA- 
Ch did not reach statistical significance once scores were combined to form factor
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scores for selective attention, sustained attention and attentional control / switching. 
After controlling IQ, only performance on the Opposite World subtest discriminated 
between the groups. Children excluded from school were also significantly less 
likely to have a timing score calculated on Creature Counting. Both these subtests 
contribute to the attentional control / switching factor. Furthermore, the excluded + 
ASD group performed extremely poorly on these subtests. It is therefore clear that, 
although no differences in selective or sustained attention are observed, there may be 
subtle differences in attentional control. This pattern of findings is consistent with an 
ASD profile (Liss et al., 2001) but not with an ADHD or CD profile (Goldberg et al., 
2005; Hill, 2002; Manley et al., 1998).
5.4 Pragmatic language.
Children excluded from school showed significantly poorer pragmatic language 
skills on the CCC than typically developing children. As predicted, no differences 
were seen on measures of structural language skills (intelligibility and fluency, and 
use of syntax). 42% of children excluded from school performed more than 3 SD 
below population norms, consistent with clinically significant levels of impairment. 
These differences could not be accounted for by more fundamental differences in IQ, 
SES or attention / executive functioning. This replicates the findings of Gilmour et 
al. (2004), with a striking level of similarity in mean scores and percentage of 
children meeting clinical cut-off points. Similar scores on the CCC have been shown 
to discriminate children with ADHD and CD from children with ASD (Gilmour et 
al., 2004; Geurts et al., 2004).
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A low Pragmatic Composite score, in combination with poor scores on the Social 
Relationships and Interests subscales, discriminates children with pure pragmatic 
language deficits from those with ASD profiles (Bishop & Baird, 2001). Children 
excluded from school showed significantly poorer scores on Social Relationships 
than peers, with 46% falling more than 3 SD below population means. In contrast, no 
statistically significant differences were seen between groups on Interests, on either 
mean scores or percentage meeting clinical cut-off. Nonetheless, it is striking that 
12% of the excluded group fell more than 3 SD below population means, compared 
to 0% of typically developing comparisons.
The majority of the excluded + ASD group showed significant difficulties with 
pragmatic language, with all but one child falling more than 2 SD below population 
means. It is interesting that case 19 (who met criteria for atypical autism) showed 
pragmatic language skills comparable to those of the comparison group. This child 
was the source of considerable concern to the researchers, and showed behaviours 
associated with emotional and sexual abuse (faecal smearing- Stower, 2000).12 It 
might be argued that his emotional needs were mislabelled as social communication 
difficulties. However, this seems unlikely for several reasons. Firstly, there is no 
reason to think that children with ASD do not experience the full range o f mental 
health difficulties in addition to their developmental disorder. Secondly, the 3di 
discriminates well between mental health difficulties and developmental disorders 
(Skuse et al., 2004). It is more plausible that this reflects measurement error. This 
child was being raised by his paternal grandmother as both his parents (and many of 
his siblings) experienced significant learning disabilities. Caregiver report may be
12 This child was referred to local Child and Family Consultation Services following the assessment.
94
biased in this case due to this child’s relatively good skills in comparison to his 
parents and siblings. This interpretation is supported by his teacher-rated pragmatic 
composite, which fell close to 2 SD  below population means. Alternatively, he may 
represent an unusual symptom profile.
Furthermore, it is striking that these deficits are apparent whether rated by parents or 
teachers. Most studies suggest that parents tend to rate difficulties as more severe 
than teachers, and that parent ratings are more closely tied to diagnosis (Bishop & 
Baird, 2001). A similar pattern was observed here- however, no statistically 
significant differences were observed between parent and teacher ratings. This 
provides strong support for the pervasive nature of the pragmatic language 
difficulties experienced by this group of children.
5.5 Social cognition.
Children were assessed on a range of measures of social cognition, including 
recognition of emotions, judgement of eye gaze, face recognition memory and theory 
of mind.
5.5.1 Emotion recognition.
Children excluded from school tended to perform less well on emotion recognition 
tasks than peers, although this difference did not reach statistical significance. The 
predicted differences for recognition of fearful and sad expressions were not 
observed. Somewhat surprisingly, children excluded from school were significantly
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poorer at recognising happy facial expressions than would be expected from 
population data. This is particularly surprising given that recognition of happy 
expressions is virtually at ceiling level by 6 years (Lawrence, Bernstein et al., 2006). 
It is unclear how to interpret this finding. It may be that children excluded from 
school are delayed in their acquisition of emotion recognition skills. However, if this 
were the case it would be reasonable to expect poorer performance relative to means 
on recognition o f other emotions. This was not seen in this sample. Alternatively, it 
may be that further work is required to understand the normal developmental 
trajectory of performance on emotion recognition tasks. Normative data provided by 
Lawrence, Bernstein et al. (2006) demonstrates wide variability in performance in 
children aged 6-13 years; however, this may in part reflect the relatively small 
sample sizes in each age / gender group (n ranging 10-27). As such, detecting 
between group differences within this age range will require larger samples. Finally, 
it is plausible that children presenting with disruptive behaviour have less exposure 
to happy expressions than children without disruptive behaviour. This explanation is 
supported by the lack of significant differences between groups for negative 
emotions (disgust, anger and fear). This study cannot distinguish between these 
possibilities.
5.5.2 Eye gaze monitoring.
Children excluded from school were more likely to show poorer performance on this 
task, however, this difference did not remain significant after controlling PIQ. A 
relationship between eye gaze monitoring and PIQ has been demonstrated in 
previous studies (Lawrence, Campbell et al., 2003; Lawrence, Kuntsi et al., 2003).
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Nonetheless, it is clear that children excluded from school perform significantly 
poorer than would be expected, with 50% performing at or below chance level. 
Children excluded from school were significantly more likely to perform at or below 
chance than their peers. The excluded + ASD group showed particularly poor 
performance, with four children performing at or below chance. These findings are 
consistent with previous research showing that a significant proportion of individuals 
with social communication difficulties show deficits on this task (Campbell et al., 
2006).
5.5.3 Face recognition memory.
No significant differences were seen between groups, either in means or in likelihood 
of performing at chance level. This contrasts with previous research suggesting that a 
high proportion of individuals with ASD have difficulties on this task (Dawson et al., 
2002). It may be that these deficits are not present in our sample, or that the sub­
group identified is too small to detect subtle deficits of this nature. There is evidence 
that children with ASD may be slower to identify faces than typically developing 
children (Serra et al., 2003). Reaction time data was not collected for this task; it is 
possible that deficits would be apparent on reaction time but not on accuracy, 
particularly if excluded children adopted a different processing strategy than 
typically developing peers.
5.5.4 Theory o f  mind.
Children excluded from school showed significantly poorer mentalising skills than
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their peers. As predicted, no differences were observed between groups in frequency 
of mentalising responses. Higher rates of mentalising responses were seen for 
animations designed to elicit mental state explanations, compared to those designed 
to elicit goal-directed explanations. This provides further support for the reliability 
and validity o f this task in assessing the mentalising abilities of children (Abell et al., 
2000).
However, differences were observed in the frequency of appropriate mentalising 
responses. Children in the excluded + ASD group performed particularly poorly, 
with 56% giving one or fewer appropriate mentalising responses. Furthermore, one 
child in the excluded + ASD group involved himself in the narrative inappropriately, 
switching into the first person when describing events. No other child showed a 
similar response style. This mirrors findings in the ASD literature, demonstrating that 
individuals with ASD use mental state concepts to explain events, but do so in an 
idiosyncratic and inappropriate manner (Campbell et al., 2006; Kaland et al., 2005). 
Deficits in mentalising ability discriminate children with ASD from those with 
ADHD or CD (Buitelaar et al., 1999; Geurts et al., 2004). Furthermore, these deficits 
could not be accounted for by IQ, SES, attention / executive functioning or 
attachment quality.
5.5.5 Relationship between measures o f social cognition.
It is unclear how to interpret the mixed findings from the emotion recognition, eye 
gaze and face recognition memory measures. A significant proportion of individuals 
with ASD experience difficulty on these tasks (Campbell et al., 2006; Dawson et al.,
2002). However, there is inconsistency in the literature, with some studies suggesting 
that deficits reflect more fundamental differences in language ability (Ozonoff, 
Pennington, & Rogers, 1990) or perceptual complexity (Castelli, 2005). Differences 
between groups in this study cannot be attributed to IQ, since the groups were 
carefully balanced on VIQ and differences in PIQ and education of carer controlled 
for statistically. Three possibilities remain: that some individuals with autism do not 
have deficits on these tasks; that individuals with autism do, but the sub-group of 
excluded + ASD children do not show deficits on these tasks; or measurement error. 
Our study cannot distinguish between the first two options. Previous research using 
the CCC had suggested that differences between excluded children and peers would 
be large (Gilmour et al., 2004). However, it seems likely that deficits in social 
cognition, if present, will be subtle and require larger samples to detect effects. The 
challenge for future studies will be to determine what magnitude of difference will be 
clinically significant. A difference of just 1 SD might be associated with impaired 
development and progress in education. It was striking that when measures of social 
cognition were combined to form the SCI, differences between groups were 
pronounced and remained even when the pragmatic composite was removed. This 
suggests that differences between groups may be too subtle to be detected in a 
sample of this size.
A strong relationship has been demonstrated between these measures of social 
cognition (Campbell et al., 2006; Lawrence, Kuntsi et al., 2003). This was not seen 
in this study, with surprisingly few significant correlations between measures. 
Previous studies with children have suggested that social communication abilities 
may be more fractionated in children with ASD compared to typically developing
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children (Brent, Rios, Happe, & Charman, 2004). Brent et al. show that performance 
on different theory of mind tasks correlates well in typically developing children, but 
not in children with ASD. It may be that a similar process is operating in this sample; 
however, the excluded + ASD subgroup is too small to allow this hypothesis to be 
tested statistically.
Perhaps the most theoretically significant correlation is seen between recognition of 
fearful expressions and appropriate mentalising. This replicates findings with 
typically developing adults (Cordon, Critchley, Dolan, & Skuse, 2006). Furthermore, 
deficits in fear recognition, eye gaze monitoring and face recognition memory are 
also seen in women with Turner’s Syndrome (Campbell et al., 2002; Lawrence, 
Campbell et al., 2003; Lawrence, Kuntsi et al., 2003). Turner’s Syndrome is a 
sporadic disorder occurring in females in which all or part o f one X-chromosome is 
deleted (Lawrence, Campbell et al., 2003). Such women experience difficulties 
forming and maintaining peer relationships and difficulties interpreting non-verbal 
communication (e.g., Downey, Ehrhardt, Gruen, Bell, & Morishima, 1989; 
McCauley, Kay, Ito, & Treder, 1987; McCauley, Ross, & Sybert, 1994). They 
therefore present with social communication deficits that, although clinically 
significant, do not warrant a diagnosis of ASD. A similar picture is seen in our 
sample, with a sub-group of children excluded from school more likely to show 
deficits in pragmatic language skills and mentalising, and possibly with deficits in 
emotion recognition and eye gaze monitoring. With increasing recognition of autism 
as a spectrum disorder, there is likely to be greater exploration of the range of 
symptom profiles seen in atypical and / or sub-clinical populations. A sub-group of
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children excluded from school may represent one such population and will warrant 
further investigation.
5.6 Is there a sub-group of children excluded from school with undetected ASD?
The results of this study provide strong evidence to suggest that a sub-group of 
children with disruptive behaviour have undetected ASD, and that their difficulties 
cannot be accounted for solely in terms of CD or ADHD. Firstly, 34% meet ICD-10 
criteria for ASD in addition to CD or Hyperkinesis. The 3di provides a dimensional 
approach to diagnosis, and therefore is uniquely placed to capture subtle or atypical 
deficits. Research on this sample of children (see Donno, 2006) suggests that 
children excluded from school can be distinguished from their peers on dimensional 
measures of autistic traits, even if they do not meet criteria for ASD. Secondly, 42% 
show deficits in pragmatic language as severe as those seen in ASD. Although 
pragmatic language deficits are seen in other developmental disorders, the severity of 
the deficits documented in this study are more consistent with ASD (Bishop & Baird, 
2001; Geurts et al., 2004; Gilmour et al., 2004). Furthermore, they present with 
deficits on theory of mind tasks similar to those documented in ASD (Abell et al., 
2000); deficits in mentalising discriminate ASD from ADHD and CD (Buitelaar et 
al., 1999; Geurts et al., 2004). There is little evidence to suggest that attentional and 
executive functions are grossly impaired in this group, and no evidence to suggest 
difficulties with response inhibition as would be expected in ADHD or CD. If 
executive dysfunction is present in this group, difficulties are in attentional switching 
consistent with an ASD profile (Liss et al., 2001). Finally, there is no evidence to
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suggest that these deficits can be explained by differences in IQ, SES or attachment 
quality.
5.7 What are the implications of these findings?
These startling findings have implications for practice and policy in clinical 
psychology and education, and for research.
5.7.1 Theoretical implications.
The findings of this study suggest that increased attention needs to be paid to the 
blurring of boundaries between mental health and developmental disorders. Research 
may have paid insufficient attention to the issue of comorbidity between ASD and 
CD. This makes distinguishing those children with additional social communication 
needs from the wider conduct disordered group very difficult, because of potential 
confounds in the research evidence. Greater integration between psychiatric and 
developmental approaches is likely to prove fruitful, both in theory and practice.
Furthermore, the findings provide further support for the conceptualisation of autism 
as a spectrum disorder. A significant sub-group of children excluded from school 
meet criteria for ASD, and show deficits on neuropsychological and neurocognitive 
measures similar in nature and severity to those documented in ASD. However, the 
data also show that the wider population of children excluded from school can be 
distinguished from their typically developing peers on indices of social cognition / 
communication (SCI). Furthermore, detailed analysis of the 3di interviews (presented
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in Donno, 2006) shows that children excluded from school can be distinguished from 
peers on dimensional measures of autistic spectrum traits. If these findings are 
correct, it will be necessary to identify the point at which deficits become disabling 
(i.e., the point at which clinical intervention is required). Many individuals with ASD 
function very well and are extremely successful within contexts that maximise their 
skills and minimise the demands on social competence (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). 
Arguing for a continuum of social competence (with extremely competent at one 
extreme and ‘classical’ autism at the other) is not to say that all individuals will want 
or require intervention.
Furthermore, the findings have implications for the debate concerning the validity of 
diagnoses within the autistic spectrum, in particular, whether Pragmatic Language 
Impairment (PLI; also termed semantic-pragmatic disorder) should be considered an 
ASD. This is a long and complex debate that will not be reviewed in detail here. 
However, this study shows that a substantial proportion of children excluded from 
school, who do not meet criteria for ASD, nonetheless have clinically significant 
impairments in pragmatic language skills. Many of these children also present with 
sub-clinical autistic spectrum traits (Donno, 2006). This group may represent another 
distinct sub-group within the excluded population, or alternatively represent a 
‘milder’ version of the ASD group. This clearly warrants further investigation. With 
increasing understanding of the neurocognitive profiles of ASD, PLI and other 
developmental disorders, the boundaries between each symptom cluster may become 
even less clear-cut than previously thought.
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5.7.2 Clinical practice.
Children excluded from school, and / or possessing a diagnosis of CD, should be 
assessed for the presence of social communication deficits. Community Mental 
Health Nurses (CMHNs) now provide input to PRU’s in some areas of the country. 
This is a positive development, but there is a need to develop outreach services to 
mainstream education to help prevent exclusions. CMHNs are ideally placed to 
identify children with developmental and / or mental health needs that warrant 
assessment by a clinical psychologist.
There is a need for greater integration between child mental health services and child 
development services. Each service draws on quite separate literature, and 
approaches behavioural difficulties from very different angles. A combination of 
both perspectives will be required if the complex needs of this group of children are 
to be met. Many o f the children in this sample presented with mental health needs in 
addition to developmental difficulties. These cases are likely to benefit from 
individual case formulations that place their behavioural difficulties in the context of 
both emotional and developmental difficulties. For example, one child meeting 
criteria for ASD also showed difficulties with attachment and anxiety associated with 
his mother’s terminal illness. To acknowledge the role of developmental factors is 
not to diminish the importance of emotional disturbance on behaviour. However, 
changes will be required in training and system organisation as well as individual 
clinical reasoning if progress is to be made.
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5 . 7.3 Educational policy and practice.
There is a need for greater recognition of the needs of children with social 
communication deficits. As this study demonstrates, these children will struggle in 
mainstream school and often find it difficult to access a Statement of Special 
Educational Need- without this they cannot receive the specialist one-to-one support 
they require. High-functioning children with ASD will present very differently to 
‘classical’ autism, and their social functioning may vary greatly between situations. 
This means that observational assessments, although crucial, are likely to be 
insufficient to capture the strengths and difficulties of these children. Even if a child 
is seen by an Educational Psychologist, children are unlikely to complete 
psychometric ability assessments or detailed assessments of their social 
communication.
Greater collaboration between clinical psychology and educational psychology 
services is likely to be helpful in meeting the needs of this group. Interventions for 
disruptive behaviour may not be effective if social communication needs are not 
appreciated (Fletcher-Campbell & Wilkin, 2003; Fishbein et al., 2006). Specialist 
provision for ASD needs to be opened up to those children with social 
communication difficulties with or without a diagnosis of ASD.
5.8 Limitations.
There is clearly a need for replication of these findings, as the present study has a 
number of limitations that reduce the strength of conclusions that could be drawn
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from the available data.
5.8.1 Sample characteristics.
Firstly, the sample sizes in each group are relatively small. Larger effect sizes were 
anticipated on the basis of previous research; however, it is apparent that the deficits 
are subtle and larger sample sizes will be required to explore deficits in social 
cognition. Secondly, the sample of excluded children here are extremely 
heterogeneous- in ability, in behaviour and in developmental level. Schools were 
asked to identify children whose behaviour had been of concern over time, and who 
were considered at high risk of exclusion. Nonetheless, the extent of behavioural 
difficulties varied across the group. In the absence of educational policy defining 
behavioural criteria for exclusion, future research should aim to refine inclusion 
criteria. This may help to reduce variability within groups; alternatively, it may be 
that children excluded from school are by definition a heterogeneous group.
5.8.2 Selection biases.
A related issue concerns potential selection biases in this sample. Schools were 
aware of the principal hypotheses of the study before commencing recruitment, and 
so it is possible that they selected only those children at risk of exclusion who 
presented with social communication deficits. This seems unlikely for two reasons. 
Firstly, given the high number of information packs given out by schools (n = 290) it 
seems highly unlikely that this reflects just the sub-set of children at risk of exclusion 
presenting with social communication difficulties. Secondly, on visiting schools to
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describe the project it was apparent that there was very little awareness of how high- 
functioning children with ASD might present in classroom situations.
There is also a potential bias in the families who chose to participate in the project. 
Uptake was extremely low in the excluded group, with a response rate of less than 
9%. It is possible that caregivers of children with social communication difficulties 
were more motivated to participate. Our data cannot exclude this possibility. 
However, even if this were to be true, it remains the case that none of the children 
meeting criteria for ASD had been assessed or were waiting to be assessed for social 
communication difficulties.
5.8.3 Neuropsychological assessment in uncontrolled environments.
Conducting neuropsychological assessments at home inevitably incurs difficulties. 
Children are potentially more distractible, and there is no guarantee of appropriate 
testing space being available (particularly in very deprived environments). This is 
likely to depress scores, particularly on long or challenging tasks. In this study, the 
effects of this were most apparent on the TEA-Ch, administered last in the battery. It 
was decided to administer measures in a fixed order in order to ensure that the most 
crucial data (IQ and social cognition) would be collected in each case. This is likely 
to explain the missing data for this measure. However, there is no reason to believe 
that these factors affected performance in the excluded group more than the 
comparison group.
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5.8.4 Caregiver report.
There are also limitations associated with using caregiver / teacher report to reach 
conclusions about diagnosis. In clinical practice, a diagnosis of ASD should not be 
made without considering caregiver report, psychometric profile and direct 
observational assessments of the child (such as the Autism Diagnostic Observational 
Schedule; ADOS- Lord et al., 1989). Future research might aim to complete the 
ADOS with children in order to improve confidence in the diagnosis.
5.8.5 Psychopathy.
Children were not screened for the presence of psychopathic traits. It might be 
argued that the difficulties experienced by the sub-group meeting criteria for ASD 
could be better explained by psychopathy, as psychopathic traits are associated with 
deficits in social cognition (Stevens et al., 2001). This seems unlikely for several 
reasons. Firstly, the prevalence of psychopathy in the general population is extremely 
low (approximately 1%- Hare, 1993). It is therefore highly unlikely that nine 
children in our community sample show significant psychopathic traits. Furthermore, 
individuals with psychopathic traits do not show deficits in mentalising (Richell et 
al., 2003) and there is concern in the literature that some individuals labelled as 
psychopathic may in fact have ASD (Solderstrom, Sjodin, Carlstedt, & Forsman, 
2004). Including a screening measure in future research would nonetheless allow this 
possibility to be excluded.
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5.9 Conclusion.
This study provides strong support for the hypothesis that a significant sub-group of 
children excluded from school have unidentified ASD. Although there is a need to 
replicate these findings, the results of this study suggest that it may be appropriate to 
consider screening for social communication difficulties among children at risk of 
exclusion from primary school.
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6.0 Tables and Figures.
6.1 Table 1: Means and SD for age and IQ scores.
Mean age in years (SD) Mean FSIQ (SD) Mean V1Q (SD) Mean PIQ (SD)
Excluded (N = 26) 9.21 (1.81) 93.50 (15.23) 98.19 (16.42) 90.23 (13.88)
Comparisons (N  = 22) 9.44(1.69) 105.82 (17.03) 105.73 (16.21) 104.68 (16.31)
6.2 Table 2: Gender and ethnicity demographic data.
M:F ratio Ethnicity (frequency data)
Afro-Caribbean W hite South Asian
Excluded (N = 26) 23:3 15 10 1
Comparisons (N = 22) 18:4 10 11 1
No. of children 
with EAL
4
1
6.3 Table 3: SES demographic data.
% Education
% % in social
unemployed GCSE FE University housing
Excluded (N = 26) 62 77 15 8 81
C °m2Parisons 22 18 46 36 77
% single 
carer
58
41
% any 
contact 
with social 
service
77
5
% any Child 
Protection 
concerns
58
0
% any 
contact with 
CAMHS
42
0
6.4 Table 4: CCC subtest descriptions, means and SD.
Description Mean (S D )
Subscale Gilmour et al. (2004) Bishop & Baird 
(2001)
A. Speech Intellig ib ility  and fluency. 3 5 .13  (1 .5 2 )
B. Syntax W hether the ch ild  can produce 
develop m en ta lly  appropriate 
sen tences in term s o f  length  and 
grammar.
3 1 .7 2  (0 .6 8 )
C. Inappropriate Initiation A  m easure o f  im p u lsiv ity  in 
language, such  as interrupting  
conversations.
2 7 .1 6 (2 .1 1 )
D. Coherence W hether the ch ild  can talk 
about past or future even ts in 
the relevant tim e con text to 
increase listener understanding.
35 .1 6  (1 .3 2 )
E. Stereotyped Language The extent to w h ich  a ch ild  
engages in con versations geared  
to their interests, and produces  
stereotyped and/or 
inappropriate phrases.
28 .03  (2 .1 4 )
F. Use of Context A  m easure o f  the use o f  con text 
to aid understanding, in clud ing  
understanding o f  sarcasm  and 
metaphor.
30 .48  (1 .8 8 )
G. Rapport The ch ild ’s ability  to start a 
conversation , u se gestures, 
interpret non-verbal 
com m unication  and use ey e  
contact appropriately.
3 2 .8 4  (1 .3 9 )
H. Social Relationships A  m easure o f  the ch ild ’s ability  
to m ake and m aintain  
friendships.
32 .7  4 (1 .9 1 )
I. Interests A  m easure o f  the ch ild ’s 
tendency to have overriding  
sp ecific  interests.
3 1 .5 4  (2 .1 1 )
PC. Pragmatic Composite Sum  o f  subtests C-G 153.68 (6 .4 9 )
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6.5 Table 5: Excluded + ASD group: Performance on neurocognitive measures.
Excluded + 
ASD ICD-10 diagnoses
Age
(m onths) Gender VIQ PIQ
Emotion  
recognition z- 
scores
Eye Gaze
(%
correct)
Face 
recognition  
(% correct)
Total no. 
appropriate 
m entalising
Pragm atic
Com posite SCI
Fear Happy responses
Case 1 Atypical autism * 123 Male 87 99 -0.62 -1.51 43.33 71.40 1 125 170.53
Case 9 PDD-NOS *% 104 Male 107 88 -0.90 0.52 33.33 76.00 1 138 173.53
Case 10 PDD-NOS * 160 Male 80 83 0.69 -0.99 50.00 53.10 1 131 183.60
Case 11 PDD-NOS * 116 Female 99 93 -2.69 0.67 50.00 72.00 2 137 190.10
Case 12 AS * f 88 Male 106 97 -1.66 -0.10 43.33 78.00 0 119 163.22
Case 16 Atypical autism*f 142 Male 109 107 1.25 -0.34 56.67 86.00 2 130 190.47
Case 18 A S * 126 Male 142 136 -0.31 -3.44 36.67 66.00 2 120 159.87
Case 19 Atypical autism * 124 Male 100 72 -0.62 -1.51 50.00 80.00 3 151 205.20
Case 22 AS * 131 Male 125 109 -1.57 -1.51 63.33 74.00 0 113 177.23
M (SD) 123.78 106.11 98.22 -0.71 -0.91 47.41 129.33 179.31
N = 9 (20.71) - (18.67) (18.28) (1.20) (1.27) (9.40) 72.94 (9.38) 1.33 (1.00) (11.65) (14.50)
M (SD)
com parisons - 113.23 105.73 104.68 -0.12 0.08 52.82 70.80 210.328
N = 22 (20.23) - (16.21) (16.31) (1.05) (0.82) (9.66) (11.26) 2 .18(1 .71) 153.86 (7.13) (15.12)
Note. * A lso meets criteria for Conduct Disorder t  Also meets criteria for Hyperkinesis X Also meets cut-off for attachment concern
6.6 Table 6: TEA-Ch means and SD  for subtests and factor scores.
N Mean (SD)
SUBTEST SCORES
Sky Search Target excluded 25 8 .52  (3 .4 7 )
com parisons 22 10.82 (2 .5 3 )
Sky Search Timing Score excluded 25 6 .6 4  (3 .1 7 )
com parisons 22 7 .6 4  (2 .9 2 )
Sky Search Attention Score excluded 25 6 .48  (3 .3 2 )
com parisons 22 7 .6 4  (2 .9 2 )
Score! excluded 25 8 .76  (3 .3 0 )
com parisons 22 10.27 (3 .4 8 )
Creature Counting- Total excluded 25 6.48  (3 .2 9 )
com parisons 22 8.91 (3 .5 6 )
Creature Counting- Timing excluded 14 8 .5 0  (4 .5 9 )
com parisons 18 8.61 (3 .1 1 )
Sky Search DT excluded 23 6 .83  (5 .7 3 )
com parisons 22 8 .0 0  (4 .6 8 )
Map Mission excluded 24 9 .5 4  (3 .2 4 )
com parisons 22 9 .0 9  (3 .4 9 )
Score DT excluded 24 7 .75  (4 .4 0 )
com parisons 22 10.32 (3 .4 1 )
Walk, Don’t Walk excluded 23 8 .04  (4 .1 3 )
com parisons 22 9 .68  (3 .3 3 )
Same World Total excluded 24 7.25  (3 .1 1 )
com parisons 22 9 .0 9  (3 .1 0 )
Opposite World Total * excluded 24 6 .88  (3 .1 5 )
com parisons 22 10.00 (3 .5 5 )
Code Transmission excluded 22 7 .3 6  (3 .5 5 )
com parisons 21 7 .33  (3 .7 1 )
FACTOR SCORES
Selective Attention excluded 24 16.13 (6 .0 0 )
com parisons 22 16.73 (5 .2 0 )
Attentional Control / Switching exclud ed 14 16.21 (6 .5 1 )
com parisons 18 18.83 (5 .7 3 )
Sustained Attention excluded 20 3 8 .2 0  (1 3 .4 7 )
com parisons 21 4 5 .6 2  (1 1 .7 1 )
* significant difference at p < .05.
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6.7 Table 7: Means and SD  for Parent CCC ratings.
Scale
Intelligibility / fluency Mean {SD)
% in clinical range
Syntax Mean (SD)
% in clinical range
Inappropriate initiation Mean (SD)* 
% in clinical range
Coherence Mean (SD)*
% in clinical range f
Stereotyped Language Mean (SD)
% in clinical range
Use of Context Mean (SD)*
% in clinical range f
Rapport Mean (SD)*
% in clinical range
Social Relationships Mean (SD)*
% in clinical range f
Interests Mean (SD)
% in clinical range
Pragmatic Composite Mean (SD)*
%  in clinical range f
Case Control
(TV =26) (TV = 22)
33.38 (4.73) 34.73 (1.75)
23 0
30.58 (1.58) 31.45 (0.86)
19 0
24.15 (2.54) 27.77 (2.58)
8 5
31.35 (2.86) 34.91 (1.41)
50 0
24.69 (2.92) 27.45 (2.70)
12 5
25.38 (2.94) 30.55 (1.50)
50 0
29.12 (3.15) 33.18 (1.33)
31 0
27.69 (3.67) 33.00 (1.20)
46 0
30.69 (3.72) 32.23 (1.93)
12 0
134.69 (10.26) 153.86 (7.13)
42 0
Note. C linically significant impairment is defined as scores falling more than 3SD  below  
population means established by Bishop & Baird (2001).
* significant at p < .001. 
f  significant at p < .001.
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6.8 Table 8: Means, SD and z-scores for proportion of correct responses on emotion 
recognition task.
Excluded group 
(A =26)
Comparison 
group (N  = 22)
Happy Mean (SD) 88.4 2 (15.67) 94.55 (8.58)
Mean z-score -0.78 (1.61) 0.08 (0.82)
Surprise Mean (SD) 65.00 (35.36) 65.00 (33.49)
Mean z-score -0.76 (2.38) -0.44(1.66)
Fear Mean (SD) 41.41 (32.22) 46.82 (24.18)
Mean z-score -0.39 (1.28) -0.12(1.05)
Sad Mean (SD) 75.77 (14.47) 81.26(14.91)
Mean z-score -0.18(0.88) 0.29 (0.91)
Disgust Mean (SD) 41.92 (38.58) 43.18 (27.15)
Mean z-score 0.22 (1.48) -0.13 (1.17)
Anger Mean (SD) 67.69 (20.46) 74.09 (18.69)
Mean z-score -0.46 (1.35) 0.16(1.03)
Note.  Z-scores derived from population data in Lawrence, Bernstein et al. (2006)- see Appendix C.
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6.9 Table 9. Means and SD for performance on the eye gaze, face recognition 
memory and mentalising tasks.
Mean (SD)
Eye Gaze Task Excluded (n = 26) 45.90 (8.45)
Comparisons (n = 22) 52.82 (9.66)
Face Recognition Memory Excluded (n = 25) 67.12 (11.28)
Comparisons (n = 21) 70.81 (11.28)
Appropriate Mentalising Responses * Excluded (n = 26) 1.27(1.19)
Comparisons (n = 22) 2.18 (1.71)
Note.  The SASI automatically generates scores for Face Recognition Memory reflecting the number 
number o f  correct responses, adjusted for the number presented. This automatically corrects for fewer 
items being presented or answered by a respondent. Scores shown here have been converted to 
percentages.
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6.10 Table 10: Means and SD  for the Social Communication Index.
Excluded group (N = 26) Comparison group (,/V = 22)
SCI Mean (SD) * 1 8 3 .1 6 (1 2 .2 4 ) 2 1 0 .2 8  (1 5 .1 2 )
* significant difference at p < .001.
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6.11 Figure 1: Recruitment process.
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Critical Appraisal
1.0 Introduction.
This appraisal uses examples from our meetings with families to draw out central 
themes arising from the research, reflecting on clinical issues raised by the home 
visits before considering the implications of the research for clinical and educational 
practice. It concludes by focusing on how clinical psychology and educational 
services might work together to meet the needs of excluded children, and sets out 
some key questions for future research.
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2.0 Issues raised by the home visits.
At the outset of the project I naively thought I was relatively experienced in working 
in deprived areas following 18 months working in very deprived and ethnically 
diverse boroughs of London. Conscious of my own social and cultural background 
(White, middle-class, university-educated female) I anticipated noticing differences 
between my own experiences, opinions and expectations, and those of the families 
we would meet through the research. This section aims to distil and reflect on those 
experiences as I approach a career in clinical psychology.
2.1 Managing risk.
The home visits raised issues of risk in many ways. Firstly, many of the participants 
lived in extremely deprived and run-down council estates with high rates of crime. 
Although all home visits were completed in pairs, it was not always possible to be 
sure of a safe location to meet beforehand. Carrying laptops and other expensive 
equipment for the visits, we were potentially a target for crime. On entering 
participants’ homes, we encountered a number of situations giving cause to consider 
our own safety (e.g., family members buying illicit drugs during the assessment; 
reports of family members convicted of violent assault or murder). It was striking 
that there was rarely any acknowledgement from the families that drug taking or 
violence were unusual. Such experiences were very much normative in their sub­
cultures. For example, one mother calmly stated that her child’s father was in prison 
for “putting a machete in someone’s head”. The challenge for me was to separate my 
own thoughts and feelings about such statements from assessing the risk of the
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situation. On reflection I do not think we encountered any situations in which either 
researcher was at significant risk; however, there were several occasions when I was 
verbally abused or hit by child participants. These experiences led me to more 
explicitly define how the assessments were conducted in order to reduce this risk. 
For example, I quickly became clearer about my expectations of the child and took 
greater care to ensure that the testing environment permitted a quick exit when 
required. Assessing the personal risk of situations is not covered extensively during 
clinical training, and, with the exception of forensic settings, is also rarely covered 
during placements. Considering the increasing shift to community-based mental 
health services, there may be an increased need for training courses to address this.
Secondly, the home visits raised issues of risk to participating children. Many of the 
children we assessed had been, or were currently, on the Child Protection Register. 
We encountered several situations giving cause for concern about child mental 
health, in particular, one child presented with behaviours associated with emotional 
and sexual abuse (e.g., faecal smearing- Stower, 2000). Any concerns were raised 
immediately in supervision, and children referred to services as appropriate. As 
members of society, and as health professionals, we have a moral and legal 
responsibility to raise concerns about child safety regardless of how we become 
aware of them (Children Act; England & Wales Statutes, 2004). This was a sobering 
reminder of the need to be alert to issues of risk at all times. However, it also 
challenged my assumptions about what is considered an acceptable and safe 
environment for a child. Many of the homes we visited were extremely poorly 
maintained, and it was very common for the child not to have eaten on the day of the 
assessment. Several children slept on the floor. However, Social Services and the
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housing association apparently considered these to be acceptable conditions for a 
child. I often found myself feeling a combination of anger and sadness on leaving 
such homes- anger that our society allows children to grow up in such conditions, 
and sadness at being unable to directly improve the situation.
These experiences provoked one of the most important changes for me personally, a 
change I both welcomed and found sad: learning not to express shock. Whether the 
shock was the environment or the experiences of the families, I rapidly learned not to 
show it. For example, on entering one home we learned that the child’s grandfather 
would have been present, but had gone to his country of origin to bury an elderly 
sibling, who had been raped and ritually murdered. In another home we heard how a 
father had left the family to form a new relationship with the underage sister of his 
partner. Learning not to automatically assume that an experience is perceived 
negatively by another person taught me a great deal about my own assumptions and 
prejudices. I found that one of the most helpful responses in these situations was 
simply to ask ‘What was that like for you?’ This not only allowed the speaker the 
opportunity to explain their perspective, but also gave me time to identify, and set 
aside, my own reactions and assumptions before responding.
2.2 Brief intervention / consultation skills.
Although we completed the visits as researchers, families were aware that we were 
completing training in clinical psychology. Many families sought advice from us 
about a range of mental health and behavioural needs: how to access adult 
counselling; how to set boundaries for children about bedtimes and television; how
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to talk to a child about terminal illness, and so on. The question in my mind was 
always how to provide input given that I would not meet with the family again or 
provide any tangible support. I was struck by the similarity of this experience to brief 
consultation on in-patient wards or drop-in centres, and considered what skills might 
transfer from these situations.
Focusing on strengths proved to be a vital component of these brief interventions. 
Exploring what resources a person has available and what helps or has helped in the 
past are key interventions in solution-focused therapy (de Shazer, 1982). Many of the 
parents we spoke with seemed hopeless about their ability to effect change, despite 
evidence that they had managed to make substantial changes in their lives. Drawing 
attention to this often freed the person to think more creatively about current 
problems. This increase in self-efficacy and self-esteem, however transitory, may 
have been beneficial to both caregiver and child.
Validating constraints and challenges also proved crucial. Many families commented 
how helpful it had been for their child to have a youth mentor. However, these 
projects last for a year at most, and then the positive relationship the child has 
developed with their mentor is lost. Many parents expressed frustration at this, 
reflecting on the importance of consistency for their children. One parent commented 
how unusual it was to have her frustrations simply listened to, not judged or brushed 
aside. This re-affirms the importance of generic therapeutic process factors over and 
above particular interventions or strategies (e.g., Martin, Garske, & Davis, 2000).
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These brief interventions often helped the caregiver find an alternative explanation or 
story for struggles in their life. Many of the children in the excluded group had a long 
history of negative interactions with other individuals and systems. For example, one 
child angrily told me “You’ve only come to see me because I’m special needs” 
betraying a painful view of himself as a ‘problem child’. Another child was 
considered at risk of exclusion because she would seek reassurance from teachers in 
a way that caused perpetual disruption to classroom management. Providing an 
alternative interpretation of her behaviour (as an anxiety management strategy) was 
felt to be helpful by her parents.
I often found myself battling against the urge to refer families to other services. 
Many of the families were currently in contact with Social Services and had a history 
o f contact with Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS). Some 
families were involved with many more services, including community policing, the 
Youth Inclusion Social Project (YISP), Educational Psychology and so on. However, 
it was far from clear that this was helpful. One parent commented that there were so 
many people “watching” her, but no-one to help when her son was excluded from 
school on his first day simply for not having the right uniform. Her experience was 
not unique. Systemic and psychodynamic models highlight that professionals will 
often refer families on to other services almost endlessly, as a way of managing or 
tolerating the anxiety of not being able to help (Miller & Rice, 1967). Although there 
were often situations in which onward referrals were appropriate, it was always 
important to reflect on my own motivation for wanting to do so.
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2.3 Psychological thinking in deprived environments- resources and goals.
At times I found myself feeling rather cynical about the value of psychological 
intervention given the levels of deprivation experienced by the families; this 
prompted me to consider the impact of disadvantage on progress in therapy.
2.3.1 Tangible resources.
Many of the behavioural strategies we might recommend as psychologists 
presuppose financial and environmental resources- for example, providing rewards 
for good behaviour or introducing time out. Even recommending to a parent that they 
remove themselves from aggressive interactions with their child assumes there is 
somewhere else to go- many of the homes we visited had no internal doors. In 
contrast, when we met with comparison families, it became clear that these families 
were coping well despite living in equally deprived circumstances. We characterised 
the difference between these families in terms of the degree of emotional 
containment provided by the parent for the child (Bion, 1970) apparent through our 
own countertransference.
2.3.2 Psychological resources.
As psychologists working with children it is crucial to attend to the personal 
resources of the parent. My thinking about this issue developed through hearing the 
experiences of some inspiring individuals. For example, we met with one mother 
with several children at risk of exclusion. She was a single parent following domestic
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violence and the consequent imprisonment of her partner. Despite the challenging 
behaviour presented by her children, she continued to hold a positive view of her 
family, describing herself as “blessed to have these children”. Another parent told us 
of how she had overcome her addiction to heroin and felt she had battled for years to 
demonstrate her competence as a parent before eventually regaining custody of her 
children. These humbling stories stood in contrast to other, less hopeful stories. One 
child with markedly hostile and aggressive behaviour was almost obsessively 
concerned that we should leave the room tidy after the assessment. We subsequently 
learned that his mother experienced severe Obsessive Compulsive Disorder and had 
declined all offers of help. His hostile and aggressive behaviour could be understood 
as a way of managing the anxiety associated with his mother’s mental health 
difficulties.
2.3.3 Models o f service provision.
Our experiences indicate there is a need for psychologists to consider financial, 
environmental and psychological obstacles to change. It is very difficult to get a 
sense of how difficult a person’s everyday life is from the comfort of a consulting 
room. There are advantages to consulting rooms- they define a safe space in which to 
think, for example- but there are other models of working that may need to be 
considered when working in deprived areas. Sure Start initiatives (e.g., Tunstill, 
Allnock, Meadows, & McLeod, 2002) take a community-based approach to 
intervention. However, there is evidence that such interventions still fail to reach 
those families most in need of help (Wiggins, Rosato, Austerberry, Sawtell, & 
Oliver, 2005). Assertive Outreach models are becoming more common when
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working with people with psychosis. Such models argue for the importance of 
ensuring people’s basic needs are met before attempting psychological work- this 
also helps to build rapport and trust before dealing with more challenging or painful 
issues. They also emphasise the importance of longer-term, consistent relationships 
between services and clients- something that many parents were keen for their child 
to experience. This may well be a more appropriate service model for working with 
children and families in very deprived areas.
2.4 Remaining conscious of difference.
The children and families who participated in this research were very diverse- in 
ethnicity, religion and socio-economic status. This impacted on our assessments in 
many ways.
2.4.1 Cultural differences.
There were marked cultural differences in the extent to which caregivers recalled 
details about developmental milestones. We found that European and Caribbean 
families tended to recall this information, whereas West and Central African families 
tended to be somewhat bemused by these questions and indicated only whether the 
child’s development was ‘normal’ or ‘not normal’. This had an impact on how the 
psychiatric interviews proceeded, with particular care needed to elicit evidence for 
typical or atypical development. Similarly, we found differences in how particular 
child behaviours are perceived in different cultures. West and Central African 
families tended to be more tolerant of rough play in boys, frequently commenting on
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how this is helpful for boys in developing strength and “toughness”. In such families, 
there tended to be disagreement between caregivers and schools about their child’s 
behaviour, with schools usually stating that the child behaved aggressively during 
free play.
2.4.2 Gender differences.
There were also differences apparent between male and female caregivers. It was our 
experience that fathers tended to provide less detail about their child than mothers, 
tended to be more definitive in their response style, and tended to be more tolerant of 
aggression and rough play. It was difficult to disentangle these differences from the 
cultural differences described above. Some fathers also seemed to identify with the 
difficulties their child experienced- for example, one father who commented “but 
that’s just how I am” when describing his son’s autistic behaviours. This may have 
affected how they rated their child’s behaviour, through the value placed on 
particular behaviours and expectations about the consequences of the behaviour.
2.4.3 Capturing difference in research.
Our sample was relatively small, and there is clearly a need to be mindful that such 
differences are generalisations. As such, it is always important to attend to how each 
individual describes their experiences. However, it is not always possible to capture 
these subtleties, particularly when using standardised instruments and quantitative 
analyses. I was reminded of the importance of triangulation (e.g., Elliott, Fisher, & 
Rennie, 1999) in assessment- attempting to capture the same concept or phenomenon
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from different perspectives or using different measures. This was built into the 
design of the study, assessing social communication skills through parent report, 
teacher report, and through direct assessment of the child. However, the value of 
triangulation presupposes good reliability and validity of measures. Many 
psychological measures are developed using exclusively white, middle-class 
participants, and care is needed when interpreting findings from other populations. 
Although there is increasing recognition of this Western bias in psychology (e.g., 
Sue, 1999) there is a need for more sustained efforts at redressing the balance and 
attending to the similarities and differences between cultures. This will require 
greater creativity and effort to engage people from different cultures in research, to 
convey the value attached to their participation and the wider impact that this will 
have on issues of discrimination.
2.5 Recruiting ‘hard-to-reach’ populations.
We found a number of strategies helpful in recruiting participants from other cultures 
and from deprived backgrounds. Uptake from information packs was very low- just 
8% in the excluded group and 12% in the comparison group. Schools provided us 
with some of the most helpful ideas about why this might be. For example, many 
caregivers had extremely low literacy levels. One school managed this issue by 
meeting individually with parents to explain the project. This highlights the 
importance of building positive contacts with members of the community being 
recruited. Schools also suggested that many families thought the project was 
interesting but were intimidated at the prospect of someone visiting their home and 
asking complicated questions. This emphasised the value of visibility and
144
approachability in recruiting hard-to-reach groups. We started spending time in 
school playgrounds at the end of the day, talking to parents and handing out 
information packs to interested families. It was our experience that once families 
gave us their contact details, they were very likely to participate (just 9 of 57 families 
later declined to participate). We were initially concerned that this strategy could be 
experienced as coercive, considering the differences in social power (e.g., SES, 
education) between ourselves and participating families. As a result, we never 
arranged appointments in playgrounds but instead provided more information and 
called a few days later to find out if families were interested. On reflection I feel that 
this strategy was successful because it offered families the opportunity to judge 
whether we were trustworthy and approachable people. Similar processes have been 
described in Sure Start initiatives, in which psychologists spend time in community 
settings partly to demystify and destigmatise psychology (Tunstill et al., 2002).
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3.0 Implications for clinical and educational policy and practice.
Data from the current study suggest that over 40% of children with disruptive 
behaviour, at risk of exclusion from school, have clinically significant difficulties 
with pragmatic language. Furthermore, over 34% meet ICD-10 criteria for ASD. 
These startling findings have significant implications for the role of clinical 
psychology in working with children at risk of exclusion, as well as for educational 
policy and practice.
3.1 Screening for ASD.
Based on these findings, one obvious recommendation might be to introduce routine 
screening in primary schools. Screening may be defined as a “public health service 
offered to a defined population, where the participants or those around them do not 
necessarily perceive that they have a disorder” (Williams & Brayne, 2006). The aim 
is to identify those likely to benefit from further investigation and / or intervention.
3.1.1 Criteria fo r  evaluating screening programmes.
The National Screening Committee (2000) sets out four criteria against which any 
potential screening programme should be evaluated: the nature of the condition; the 
measures used to evaluate it; what interventions are available and whether they are 
effective; and whether the screening programme is effective in reducing the negative 
impact of the condition. Several recent reviews have concluded that screening for 
ASD is not currently justified (e.g., Gray, 2004; Williams & Brayne, 2006). These
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reviews focus on the lack of conceptual clarity about ASD, lack of a suitable measure 
and lack of evidence for effective interventions.
3.1.2 Conceptual issues in ASD.
There is ongoing debate regarding whether a categorical or dimensional 
classification approach is appropriate for ASD. Some reviews suggest that it may not 
be possible to screen for a dimensional disorder, since capturing the heterogeneity 
might mean reducing specificity (Williams & Brayne, 2006).
3.1.3 Screening measures.
Identifying a suitable screening tool is a central and unresolved issue. The National 
Screening Committee (2000) state that a measure must be (1) designed for use in 
educational / primary care setting, (2) have a cut-off score and be validated against 
standard diagnostic tools or clinical diagnosis, and (3) possess good sensitivity, 
specificity and positive predictive value, as evaluated in the general population. 
Williams and Brayne (2006) argue that there is currently no screening tool for ASD 
meeting these criteria. The current study found that combining scores from pragmatic 
language assessments and measures of social cognition to form the Social 
Communication Index (SCI) discriminated well between excluded and non-excluded 
children, and between ASD and typically developing children. However, this index 
would require considerably greater investigation to determine appropriate cut-off 
scores before considering whether it might function as a screening tool.
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3.1.4 Interventions.
There is little conclusive evidence for effective intervention for ASD (e.g., Bassett, 
Green & Kazanjian, 2000; Hwang & Hughes, 2000; Williams & Brayne, 2006), 
although adaptations in environment and interactions may be helpful in managing 
behaviour. Furthermore, there is very little research exploring the effectiveness of 
educational interventions for disruptive behaviour (Fletcher-Campbell & Wilkin,
2003). Both literatures are dominated by clinical opinion and anecdotal evidence, 
rather than on methodologically sound research studies. The research studies that are 
available focus on short term, often subjective, outcomes. Short-term improvements 
in behaviour are clearly crucial for teachers; however, longer-term improvements in 
social inclusion (e.g., likelihood of gaining and maintaining employment) are likely 
to be of greater value to the child and family.
Most educational interventions for primary age children focus on maintaining the 
child within mainstream settings, although some children will eventually be placed in 
Pupil Referral Units (PRU). One widely practiced intervention is ‘Circle Time’ 
(Mosely & Tew, 1999), regular sessions when children have the opportunity to 
reflect on their experiences in smaller groups. The aim is to increase empathy and 
combat bullying by increasing understanding of different perspectives (Fletcher- 
Campbell & Wilkin, 2003). Observational studies suggest that introducing circle 
time can reduce the incidence of severely disruptive behaviour and improve pupils’ 
self-confidence (Kelly, 1999). It is self-evident that the needs of a child with deficits 
in mentalising and / or attentional control would be very different from the needs of a 
typically developing child in such a group. These deficits are commonly found in
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children with ASD, and, as this study suggests, in a sub-group of children with 
conduct problems. Children with mentalising deficits are likely to require additional 
supports to think about the mental states of others- for example, using ‘thought 
bubbles’ helps to promote perspective taking in children with ASD (Kerr & Durkin,
2004). With such supports in place, circle time interventions have the potential to 
help support the development of children with social communication deficits in 
mainstream education.
Assertive discipline, a package of behavioural management strategies, focuses on 
teacher behaviour that increases time spent on-task and decreases time spent on 
disruptive behaviour (Canter & Canter, 1976). It emphasises the importance of 
clearly specified codes of conduct, unambiguous positive feedback for following 
rules, and a hierarchy of sanctions for rule-breaking which are implemented 
consistently. The approach needs to be adopted by the entire school so that children 
are always clear about what is expected from them. Implementing this approach 
increases on task behaviour, increases the frequency of praise, and decreases 
frequency of disruption (Swinson & Melling, 1995). The emphasis on consistency 
and clear boundaries is in agreement with many behavioural approaches for ASD 
(DfES, 2002). However, the challenge for schools is to ensure that expectations and 
consequences are always consistent; children with ASD may not be able to respond 
appropriately to one-off lapses in implementation of rules, and indeed may find such 
apparently inexplicable changes highly anxiety-provoking and distressing. 
Challenging behaviour is far more likely under such circumstances.
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PRUs provide education for pupils on permanent and fixed term exclusions, with an 
emphasis on basic literacy, numeracy and life skills. The central aim is to prepare 
children and schools for re-integration back to the mainstream. Provision in PRUs 
has been the subject of considerable criticism in the past decade (e.g., Office for 
Standards in Education, 1995; Parsons, 1996). Despite this, there continues to be 
very little independent evaluation of services and effectiveness for primary age 
children. Studies focusing on children’s experiences of PRUs highlight increased 
awareness of appropriate behaviour and optimism about returning to school as key 
indicators of successful reintegration (Hayden & Ward, 1996). There is currently no 
evidence available to help understand what aspects of PRU provision might be 
helpful or unhelpful to children with social communication difficulties. However, it 
seems plausible that smaller group teaching, with an emphasis on one-to-one 
relationships and regulating behaviour, would be crucial. Due to pragmatic language 
difficulties, many children with social communication difficulties require one-to-one 
support in order to ensure that instructions are understood and followed 
appropriately. Furthermore, such children may need external support to remain on- 
task, rather than being distracted by rituals or specific interests, and to form positive 
peer relationships. The value of this support for all excluded pupils has been 
repeatedly emphasised, however, such individualised support systems are not always 
easy to accommodate in mainstream schools (GEST Programme, 1999). This issue is 
highlighted by Kinder et al. (2000), who note that the success of PRU interventions 
should be judged by the number of children who remain in school following 
reintegration, rather than just the numbers reintegrated per se. It appears that if 
children with conduct problems and ASD are to be meaningfully included in the
150
mainstream, then services may need to be more flexible and creative in their 
approach.
3.1.5 Outcome measurement.
It may also be helpful to consider alternative outcome measures when evaluating the 
usefulness of screening and interventions. Recent reviews consider only how 
interventions affect aspects of social functioning, and do not consider the impact of 
diagnosis on likelihood of negative social outcomes, such as exclusion (e.g., Gray, 
2004; Williams & Brayne, 2006) Since exclusion from school is associated with a 
host of other negative outcomes (e.g., imprisonment), there seems little justification 
for not considering likelihood of exclusion as an outcome.
3.1.6 What kind o f screening programme?
Most reviews (e.g., Gray, 2004; Williams & Brayne, 2006) focus on primary 
screening- universal screening for a particular disorder- and do not address the 
validity of secondary screening, where only groups known to be at higher risk for a 
disorder are screened. Our data suggest that children excluded from school are 
significantly more likely than peers to meet ICD-10 criteria for ASD. Furthermore, 
they are also significantly more likely to demonstrate clinically significant 
impairments in pragmatic language skills- this replicates several existing studies 
(e.g., Geurts et al., 2004; Gilmour, Hill, Place, & Skuse, 2004). As such, they 
represent a group at higher risk for ASD, and secondary screening may be 
appropriate. Furthermore, concerns about reduced specificity due to the dimensional
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nature of ASD (Williams & Brayne, 2006) are less applicable when screening at-risk 
groups, compared to general population screening (O’Toole, 2000).
3.2 Raising awareness of ASD.
Alternative approaches to screening emphasise increasing awareness in educational 
and healthcare services, such that individuals exhibiting behaviours associated with 
ASD would be more readily referred for detailed specialist assessment. It is argued 
that this approach avoids potential negative outcomes associated with false positives- 
that is, wrongly identifying children as having ASD- such as increased parental 
anxiety and social stigma (Williams & Brayne, 2006). It was our experience that 
there was little awareness amongst many teachers about how a high-functioning child 
with ASD would present in the classroom. Interventions focusing on increasing 
awareness are likely to be helpful whether or not routine screening is adopted. There 
are now specialist materials available to help teachers understand the behaviour of 
children with ASD in classroom settings (Skuse & Chilvers, 2006).
3.3 Developing links between clinical psychology and educational services.
Promoting links between clinical psychology and educational services will be helpful 
in increasing awareness of ASD and the impact on education. Community Mental 
Health Nurses (CMHN) now provide input to Pupil Referral Units in some London 
boroughs. This is a positive development that recognises the complex interaction 
between mental health and academic attainment. Such CMHNs are also uniquely 
placed to promote links between education and mental health services; however,
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there is a need for outreach services to mainstream schools. Fostering a greater 
understanding of the impact of mental health in mainstream education has the 
potential to reduce the number of exclusions: evidence suggests that children whose 
Special Educational Needs (SEN) are recognised are less likely to be excluded than 
those children with unrecognised SEN (DfES, 2005).
There is also a need to promote better understanding of neuro-developmental 
disorders. A recent campaign by the National Autistic Society (Barnard, Prior & 
Potter, 2000) highlights that children with autism are significantly more likely to be 
excluded from school than their peers. It is likely that the rates of exclusion are far 
higher for those children with social communication difficulties, but without a formal 
diagnosis of ASD, such as the children identified in this study. However, promoting 
understanding of developmental disorders will require far more than providing 
education and information. Traditionally, child mental health and child development 
are viewed as separate specialities, manifest in the division of services between 
CAMHS and Child Development Teams (CDT). This separation is also apparent in 
the child psychology literature, and in clinical psychology training. Insufficient 
attention has been paid to the interaction between the two specialities. Our 
experience with the children in this study suggests that this may lead to a number of 
inappropriate consequences and unmet needs. A child’s psychological needs may 
lead to their developmental needs being overlooked. For example, one child at risk of 
exclusion had experienced severe neglect in his early years, and showed a number of 
attachment-disordered behaviours (e.g., over-familiarity with strangers) as well as 
low self-esteem (e.g., tearing up all his school work). However, he also displayed 
marked speech articulation difficulties that were only identified at seven years of age.
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Alternatively, a child’s developmental needs may lead to their psychological needs 
being overlooked. One boy whose educational attainment was poor also showed 
evidence of anxiety and depression associated with his mother’s terminal illness, and 
yet was not receiving any psychological support around these issues. Many children 
displaying the most extreme challenging behaviour showed a combination of 
developmental and mental health difficulties. For example, one child who showed 
extremely violent behaviour in school was found to meet criteria for Asperger 
Syndrome and also evidenced low self-esteem and depression associated with 
reduced contact with a non-resident parent.
Many of these families had long histories of contact with CAMHS services, and yet 
as far as we were able to ascertain had never been assessed for developmental or 
neurocognitive difficulties. It seems unlikely that clinical psychology will be able to 
raise awareness of the interaction between developmental and mental health 
disorders unless the division in services and literatures is addressed within the 
profession first. There are encouraging signs that this may be beginning- for 
example, there is increasing interest in the links between neuropsychology, 
neuroscience and education (Goswami, 2006). Although this literature is in its 
infancy, it is likely to promote more individualised understanding of the links 
between neuropsychological profiles, psychological well-being and educational 
attainment. Such work may also help to refine interventions for children with ASD, 
based on their very differing needs and abilities. In turn, this may help to address 
some of the concerns regarding screening programmes, by providing evidence that 
identifying difficulties can help promote better outcomes.
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4.0 Developing a screening process.
This appraisal has argued for greater integration between clinical psychology and 
educational services, drawing on mental health, developmental and educational 
models of practice to help meet the needs of this challenging group. In this 
concluding section I outline how this might work in practice, and what further work 
is required to refine this process.
Children excluded from primary school are a highly heterogeneous group- in age, 
ability, ethnicity, and crucially in their social communication and social cognition. A 
sub-group of these children may have previously unidentified ASD. Many also 
present with complex mental health and social care needs. This means that a ‘one- 
size-fits all’ approach to assessment and / or intervention is unlikely to be helpful. 
Furthermore, the range of outcomes measured will need to be equal to the variation 
within the group in order to begin evaluating the long-term impact of interventions.
4.1 A secondary screening strategy.
Children considered at risk of exclusion, and / or showing significant disruptive 
behaviour, and / or meeting criteria for Conduct Disorder, could be screened 
routinely either in school or in healthcare settings. If the measures used in this study 
proved to reliably discriminate between groups, screening might simply consist of 
questionnaires completed by parents, and brief computerised measures of 
mentalising / social cognition. Such a battery would take no more than 30 minutes to 
complete, and could be administered by any suitably trained healthcare or education
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worker. Interpretation would ideally be provided by clinical psychology in 
conjunction with educational psychology services to determine whether further, more 
detailed evaluation of social communication abilities was warranted. If so, such an 
evaluation could then proceed jointly, with clinical psychology / psychiatry assessing 
for the presence of ASD, whilst educational psychology services explored 
attainments and considered what support might be available locally. This might 
mean that children with social communication difficulties, but without a diagnosis of 
ASD, could have access to the specialist educational support available to children 
with a diagnosis (DfES, 2002).
4.2 Taking it forward: directions for research.
This is an ambitious process, and clearly extrapolates ahead of the data currently 
available. Nonetheless, it could be viewed as a framework within which to target 
future research, namely:
1. Can the finding that over 34% of children excluded from school meet criteria 
for ASD be replicated: in other areas of the country, by other researchers?
2. Can these children be reliably distinguished from the wider conduct 
disordered population, to such an extent that the risks of screening 
programmes (e.g., parental anxiety from false positives) are outweighed by 
the potential benefits?
3. Can early identification of ASD be shown to reduce the likelihood of 
exclusions? Can it also be shown to have other positive benefits, such as 
improved self-esteem or improved educational attainment?
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4. Can the benefits to the child, and to society as a whole, justify the increased 
costs of such multi-agency processes?
5. 0 Conclusion.
This research has had a significant impact on me, both personally and professionally. 
Meeting with these families and having the opportunity to reflect on the struggles 
they face has been invaluable. I am grateful to them for the willingness with which 
they shared their experiences. Furthermore, the findings of the research suggest that 
there may be new ways to approach the challenges posed by children excluded from 
primary school, and exciting possibilities to think differently about how services 
meet their needs. The contribution of these families therefore has the potential to 
help many more children facing similar difficulties. It is to be hoped that the findings 
of the research can be taken forward so that their contribution can be valued by 
others outside the project: perhaps even by those with the power to effect change.
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Ethics Com m ittee subject to the following conditions.
1. Your research  m ust com m ence within twelve months of the date of this letter 
and ethical approval is given for a period of thirty-six months from the 
com m encem ent of the project. If you wish to start the research m ore than 
twelve m onths from the date of this letter or extend the duration of your 
approval you should seek  Chairm an's approval.
2. You m ust seek  C hairm an’s  approval for proposed am endm ents to the research  
for which this approval h as been given. Ethical approval is specific to this 
project and m ust not be treated as applicable to research of a similar nature, 
eg. using the sa m e  procedure(s) or medicinal product(s). Each research 
project is reviewed separately and if there  are significant changes to the 
research  protocol, for exam ple in response to a grant giving body's 
requirem ents you should seek  confirmation of continued ethical approval.
3. R esearchers are reminded that REC approval does not imply approval by the 
GOS Trust. R esearchers should confirm with the R&D office that all necessa ry
( perm issions have been  obtained before proceeding.
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4. It is your responsibility to notify the Committee immediately of any information 
which would raise questions about the safety and continued conduct of the 
research.
5. On completion of the research, you must submit a report of your findings to the 
Research Ethics Committee. You may also be required to submit annual 
reports.
6. Specific conditions pertaining to the approval of this project are:
• The use of the enclosed standard consent forms for the research. A copy of
the signed consent form must be placed in the patient’s clinical records and a 
copy must be kept by you with the research records,
Yours sincerely
Laura Howe
 
 
A2: Consent form.
RI-C No.  0 1 B S 0 9 Version I. dated 3-Sop-U?
G rea t  O rm o n d  Street Hospital for Children N H S  Trust and Institute o f  
C hild Health Research Ethics Com m ittee
Title: T h e  d e tec t ion ,  m easu rem en t  and treatm ent o f  social c om m u n ica t ion  
d iso r d e r s  a m o n g  children excluded  from school
NOT ES FOR PARENTS OR GUARDIANS
1. Y our ch ild  has been  asked  to take part in a research  study. The person o rgan ising  that 
s tudy  is resp o n s ib le  for exp la in ing  I he project to you before you give consent.
2. P lease  ask the resea rcher any questions you m ay have about th is  p ro ject, befo re you decide 
w h e th e r  you  w ish  to participate.
3. I f  you  dec id e , n o w  or at any  o ther stage, that you do not w ish your child to partic ipate  in 
the research  p ro jec t, tha t is en tirely  your right, and if  your child  is a patient it w ill not in 
any w ay p re ju d ice  any  p resen t or future treatm ent.
4. Y ou w ill be g iven  an  in fo rm ation  sheet w hich describes the research  pro ject. This 
in fo rm a tio n  sh ee t is fo r you to  keep and refer to. P lease  read  it carefu lly .
5. I f  you have  any co m p la in ts  about the w ay in w hich this research project has been or is 
b e in g  co n d u c ted , p lease , in the first instance, d iscuss them  w ith the researcher. If the 
p ro b le m s  are n o t reso lved , o r you w ish to com m ent in any o ther way, p lease con tact the 
C h a irm an  o f  the R esearch  E th ics C om m ittee , by post via T he R esearch  and D evelopm ent 
O ffice , In stitu te  o f  C h ild  H ealth , 30 G uilford  Street. L ondon W C IN 1EH or if  urgent, by 
te lep h o n e  on 020  7905 2620  and the com m ittee adm in istra tion  will put you in contact 
w ith  h im .
e x p la in ed  to m e to  m y /o u r sa tisfac tion , and 1/We give perm ission  for our child  to take part 
in  this study , I/W e have read  bo th  d ie  notes w ritten  above and the Inform ation Sheet 
p rov ided , and  u n d ers ta n d  w hat the research  study involves.
C o n se n t  Form for P A R E N  TS O R  G U A R D I A N S
o f  C hildren  Participat ing in Research  Studies
CONSENT
I/W c  . being  the paren t(s)/guard ian(s) o f
agree that the R esearch  P roject nam ed above has been
SIGNED (Parent (s)/Guardian (s) ) PRINTED DATE
SIGNED (Researcher) PRINTED DATE
R E C N o .  0 I B S O 9 V e r s i o n  1. d a t e d  3 - S c p - 0 3
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A3: Assent form.
R EC  N'o. 0 1 B S 09  V ersion  I , da ted  ? -Sop-0 >
G rea t  O rm o n d  Street H ospital for Children N H S  Trust  and Institute o f  
C hild  Health  Research Ethics Com m ittee
A s sen t  F orm  for  C H I L D R E N  Participating in Research  Studies
Title: T h e  d etect ion ,  m ea su rem en t  and treatment o f  social com m unicat ion  
d iso rd er s  a m o n g  ch i ldren  excluded from school
NOTES FOR CHILDREN
1. Y ou  have been  asked  to take part in som e research. T he person organ ising  that study 
m ust ex p la in  the p ro jec t to you before you agree to take part.
2. P lease ask  the researcher any questions you like abou t this pro ject, before you decide 
w h e th e r to jo in  in.
3. If  you d ec id e , now  or at any o the r tim e, that you do not w ish to be involved in the 
research  p ro jec t, ju s t  tell us and  vve will stop the research, If you are a patient your 
trea tm en t w ill carry  on as it w ou ld  norm ally.
4. Y ou w ill be g iven  an  in fo rm ation  sheet w hich describes the research. This inform ation 
is for you  to  keep  and refer to at any  time. P lease r ea d  it carefully.
5. I f  y ou  have  any  co m p la in ts  ab o u t the research  project, d iscuss them  w ith the researcher. 
I f  the p ro b le m s are no t reso lved , or you w ish to com m en t in any o ther way, please 
con tac t the C ha irm an  o f  the R esearch  Ethics C om m ittee, by post via The R esearch and 
D ev e lo p m en t O ffice. In s titu te  o f  Child  H ealth , 30 G uilfo rd  Street, London W C IN  IHH 
or i f  u rgent, by te lep h o n e  on 020  7905 2620 and the com m ittee adm in istra tion  will put 
you  in con tac t w ith  h im .
ASSENT
I ___________________________________________________ agree that the R esearch  P roject nam ed
above has been ex p la in ed  to m e to m y satisfaction , and I agree to take part in this study.
I have read  bo th  the no tes w ritten  abo v e  and the Inform ation Sheet about the project, and
unders tand  w hat the research  study  involves.
SIGNED PRINTED DATE
SIGNED (Researcher) PRINTED DATE
R E C  N o .  0 1 B S 0 9  Version I . dated 3 -Sep-03
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A4: Information sheet for caregivers.
Parent Information Sheet. 
The detection, measurement and treatment of social communication 
disorders among children excluded from school.
Aim.
We think that some children who get into trouble at school may have a previously 
unidentified social communication disorder. The disorder means they have difficulty 
using and understanding language and getting along with people. Some of these 
children may have been excluded or are at risk of exclusion from school.
Why is the study being done?
We want to screen children who are at risk of exclusion or have been excluded from 
school. We think some of these children may have features of the disorder we are 
investigating. We will offer children and their families who we identify as being 
affected in the course of this study, specialised support and treatment. We will also 
help teachers in school understand the sort of problems that these children have. The 
support and treatment we have in mind is specialised. The treatment for children with 
general behavioural difficulties is unlikely to be as helpful to the particular children 
we identify.
How is the study to be done?
Two research workers will visit you at home. If you prefer you can come to the 
hospital for a few hours. If you choose to come to the hospital, we will pay your and 
your child’s travel expenses. We will set up the appointment at a time that suits you. 
It will last a few hours and usually only one appointment will be necessary.
During the appointment one research worker will talk to you about how your child is 
getting along. In particular we will want to discuss language and social relationships. 
At the same time, the other research worker will do a number o f different games and 
puzzles with your child.
We will also ask your permission to contact your child’s school (even if your child 
has been permanently excluded from school). We will ask school teachers to 
complete questionnaire about similar topics to the ones you discussed with the 
research worker during your appointment.
What are the risks and discomforts?
There are no discomforts associated with the assessments we are doing. Children 
usually enjoy doing the games and puzzles.
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There is a chance that in the course of the assessment, we will find that your child 
has a previously unidentified disorder. If we think your child is affected, we will 
offer specialised treatment and support.
Who will have access to the case/research records?
Only the researchers and a representative of the Research Ethics Committee will 
have access to the data collected during this study.
The use of some types of personal information is safeguarded by the Data Protection 
Act 1998 (DPA). The DPA places an obligation on those who record or use personal 
information, but also gives rights to people about whom information is held. If you 
have any questions about data protection, contact the Data Protection officer via the 
switchboard on 020 7405 9200 extension 5217.
What are the arrangements for compensation?
This research has been approved by an independent Research Ethics Committee who 
believe that it is of minimal risk to your child. However, research can carry 
unforeseen risks and we want you to be informed of your rights in the unlikely event 
that any harm should occur as a result of taking part in this study.
No special compensation arrangements have been made for this project but you have 
the right to claim damages in a court of law. This will require you to prove a fault on 
the part of the Hospital and/or any manufacturer involved.
What are the potential benefits?
In time, more excluded children may be screened as a matter of course, to assess for 
the disorders we are investigating. Specialised treatment and support is available in 
the NHS, if a child is properly identified as having the disorder in the first place. 
Ultimately some of these children may be able to stay in mainstream school, rather 
than attend schools for children with special educational needs which are more 
expensive to run.
Do I have to take part in this study?
If you decide, now or at a later stage, that you do not wish to participate in this 
research project, that is entirely your right and will not in any way prejudice any 
present or future treatment.
Who do I speak to if problems arise?
If you have any complaints about the way in which this research project has been, or 
is being conducted, please, in the first instance, discuss them with Dr Jane Gilmour. 
If the problems are not resolved, or you wish to comment in any other way, please 
contact the Chairman of the Research Ethics Committee, by post via the Research 
and Development Office, Institute of Child Health, 30 Guilford Street, London 
WC1N 1EH, or if urgent, by telephone on 020 7905 2620 and the Committee 
administration will put you in contact with him.
Details of how to contact the Researcher.
Dr Jane Gilmour can be contacted by telephone (020 7831 0975) or by post at: The 
Brain and Behavioural Sciences Unit, The Institute of Child Health.
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A5: Information sheet for excluded children.
Child Information Sheet
The detection, measurement and treatment of social communication 
disorders among children excluded from school.
Aim.
We think that some children who are getting into trouble with their teacher and 
classmates at school might have a special type of problem. The problem means that 
might find it difficult to talk to other children or understand what they are saying. 
They may also have problems getting along with other people. Children with this 
type of problem can’t help it, but nobody may know yet that they have these 
difficulties.
Why is the study being done?
There are special ways to help children with these types of difficulties. If we can find 
out which children have the problems in the first place, we may be able to help them 
keep out of trouble.
What will happen?
If you take part, we will come and see you at home or you will be invited to come to 
see us for a morning or afternoon.
You will be asked to do lots of different games and puzzles. Children usually enjoy 
doing them.
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A6. Information sheet for comparison children.
Child Information Sheet
The detection, measurement and treatment of social communication 
disorders among children excluded from school. 
Aim.
We want to talk to children, like you, who are getting along well in school.
We know that you are not getting into trouble at school but we think that some 
children who are getting into trouble might have a special type of problem. The 
problem means that might find it difficult to talk to other children or understand what 
they are saying. They may also have problems getting along with other people. 
Children with this type of problem can’t help it, but nobody may know yet that they 
have these difficulties.
Why is the study being done?
There are special ways to help children with these types of difficulties. If we can find 
out which children have the problems in the first place, we may be able to help them 
keep out of trouble.
What will happen?
If you take part, we will come and see you at home or you will be invited to come to 
see us for a morning or afternoon. You will be asked to do lots of different games 
and puzzles. Children usually enjoy doing them.
We need to know how children who are getting along well at school, do in these 
games and puzzles. That is why we have asked you to take part.
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Appendix B: Teacher CCC data.
Excluded 
(TV =25)
Comparisons 
(TV =21)
Intelligibility / fluency Mean (SD) 
% in clinical range
33.32 (4.39) 
16
34.24 (1.89) 
5
Syntax Mean (SD) 
% in clinical range
30.76 (1.62) 
16
31.67 (0.66) 
0
Inappropriate initiation Mean (SD)* 
% in clinical range
25.32 (2.69) 
8
28.24(1.09)
0
Coherence Mean (SD) 
% in clinical range
33.32 (3.33) 
24
34.38 (2.25) 
19
Stereotyped Language Mean (SD) 
% in clinical range
26.04 (3.45) 
16
28.62 (1.86) 
0
Use of Context Mean (SD)* 
% in clinical range
27.24 (2.74) 
20
30.19 (2.34) 
5
Rapport Mean (SD) 
% in clinical range
30.28 (2.99) 
20
31.52 (2.40) 
19
Social Relationships Mean (SD)* 
% in clinical range
26.76 (3.85) 
56
31.86 (2.92) 
14
Interests Mean (SD) 
% in clinical range
30.84 (2.10) 
0
30.71 (1.88) 
0
Pragmatic Composite Mean (SD)* 
% in clinical range
142.20 (11.84) 
20
152.95 (7.28) 
0
Note. Clinically significant impairment was defined as scores falling more than 3 SD  below  
population means provided by Bishop & Baird (2001 ).No significant group differences were 
observed between parent and teacher ratings on CCC subscales or on the pragmatic composite for 
both mean and percentage in clinical range (p < 0.01). Furthermore, the pragmatic composite 
scores are highly correlated (r  = 0.45, p < 0.01).
* significant at p < 0.001
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Appendix C: Normative data for SASI emotion recognition task.
Age
(Years, months)
Happy
(% accuracy) 
Mean (SD)
Surprised 
(% accuracy) 
Mean (SD)
Fearful 
(% accuracy) 
Mean (SD)
Sad
(% accuracy) 
Mean (SD)
Disgusted 
(% accuracy) 
Mean (SD)
Angry
(% accuracy) 
Mean (SD)
6,0-6,11 Males (n = 24 ) 83.33 (16.06) 56.67 (33.19) 39.68 (22.47) 75.83 (15.01) 30.00 (27.35) 70.42 (24.40)
Females (n = 25 ) 95.60 (8.70) 64.80 (33.31) 40.40 (29.65) 82 .80(18.15) 34.80 (32.03) 82.40(17.86)
7,0-7,11 Males (n = 19 ) 90.53 (15.08) 48.95 (36.65) 50.47 (30.38) 85.26 (16.11) 24.21 (27.55) 78.42 (17.08)
Females (n = 2 4 ) 95.00 (7.80) 71.94 (32.58) 50.00 (25.02) 83.33 (13.41) 33.38 (29.10) 78.75 (19.41)
8,0-8,11 Males (n = 20) 88.50 (22.31) 73.50 (30.83) 46.00 (28.73) 69.00 (23.15) 38.00(19 .08) 66.00 (25.63)
Females (n = 25) 98.40 (3.74) 72.00 (24.66) 50.22 (22.39) 79.20(18 .01) 42.40 (24.71) 73.49 (20.48)
9,0-9,11 Males (n = 23) 96.09 (7.83) 70.43 (34.44) 53.43 (22.20) 76 .09(16.99) 40.00 (25.94) 75.65 (13.08)
Females (n = 25) 96.76 (4.83) 83.38 (16.30) 54.00(16.33) 77.20(13 .70) 56.40 (30.40) 73 .20(19.30)
10,0-10,11 Males (n = 24) 97.83 (5.18) 83.48 (10.71) 49.86 (31.82) 76.96 (20.10) 42.37 (25.58) 70.87 (15.35)
Females (n = 25) 96.80 (7.48) 89.60(12.41) 52.62 (26.97) 72 .80(15.42) 62.00 (25.66) 75.20(17 .59)
11,0-11,11 Males (n -  27) 
Females (n = 25)
92.96 (8.69) 
96.25 (6.47)
79.63 (18.70) 
91.25 (15.69)
65.56 (19.48) 
55.83 (27.33)
72 .96(19.38) 
74.58 (15.03)
52.59 (26.97) 
67.82 (26.66)
72.22 (20.06) 
71.62(15 .17)
12,0-12,11 Males (n -  25) 
Females (n = 17)
96.40 (6.38)
99.41 (2.43)
80.80(19.56) 
82.35 (12.51)
55.20 (23.30) 
64.31 (22.07)
78 .40(16.75)
80 .00(10.61)
61.60 (26.56) 
61.18(23 .15)
67.20 (20.11) 
78.82 (15.76)
13,0-13,11 Males (n -  25)  
Females (n — 20)
96.80 (6.90) 
94.62 (8.64)
85.60(13.25) 
87.53 (14.86)
56.80(19.09) 
62.63 (23.30)
77 .60(17.86)
71.99(13 .51)
61.20 (24.55) 
73.23 (19.88)
72 .80(16 .96)  
76.32 (17.07)
Note. From Age, gender and puberty influence the development o f  fac ia l emotion recognition, by K. Lawrence, D. Bernstein , et al., 2006, manuscript submitted for 
publication. Adapted with permission. Normative data for ages 14-16 years are omitted for brevity.
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